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VI. Prisoners' Rights 
Although lawful imprisonment deprives prisoners of many rights, 2898 they 
do retain certain constitutional rights.2899 Federal courts, while reluctant to 
interfere with the internal administration of prisons, 2900 will intervene to 
remedy violations of those rights retained by prisoners.2901 A prison regula-
tion that infringes on a prisoner's constitutional rights is valid only if it is 
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. 2902 
The Supreme Court has identified four relevant factors in determining the 
reasonableness of a prison regulation. Courts should consider (1) whether 
2898. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517,524 (1984); see Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480,493 (1980) 
(conviction and sentencing deprives person of right to freedom from confinement); Bell v. Wolfish, 
441 U.S. 520, 546 (1979) (convicted prisoners do not have full range of freedoms available to unin-
carcerated individuals). 
2899. See e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95-96 (1987) (prisoners retain fundamental right to 
marry subject to substantial restrictions as result of incarceration); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 
523 (1984) (prisoners retain those rights compatible with objectives of incarceration); Bounds v. 
Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977) (prisoners retain right of access to courts); Wolff v. McDonnell, 
418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974) (prisoners retain right to due process subject to restrictions imposed by 
nature of penal system); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 n.2 (1972) (per curiam) (prisoners retain 
limited first amendment right to free exercise of religion); Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 333-34 
(1968) (per curiam) (prisoners retain right to equal protection); cf. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 
102-03 (1976) (prisoners may sue under § 1983 for civil damages when right to be free from cruel 
and unusual punishment violated). 
Both convicted individuals and pretrial detainees retain constitutional rights while incarcerated, 
but the source of the constitutional protection depends upon the individual's status. See Bell v. 
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.l6 (1979) (eighth amendment scrutiny for cruel and unusual punish-
ment appropriate only after constitutional guarantees associated with criminal prosecutions satis-
fied; until then, due process clause controls); Berry v. City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489, 1493 (lOth 
Cir. 1990) (eighth amendment applies to claims of incarcerated persons whose guilt has been adjudi-
cated but who await sentencing). Although pretrial detainees enjoy greater constitutional protec-
tion than convicted prisoners, recent cases suggest that the constitutional protection afforded 
pretrial detainees may be diminishing. 
2900. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 85 (1987) (prison administration committed to legislative 
and executive branches; concern for separation of powers, as well as state sovereignty, requires 
judicial restraint); Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 584-85 (1984) (courts should defer to "expert 
judgment" of prison authorities); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 352 (1981) (in overseeing 
constitutional rights with respect to confinement courts cannot assume prison officials insensitive to 
constitutional requirements or to problems of achieving goals of penal system); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 
U.S. 520, 540 n.23 (1979) (courts should defer to prison administrators' adoption and implementa-
tion of prison policies needed to ensure order and security); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' 
Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 126 (1977) (courts should give wide-ranging deference to decisions 
of prison officials); cf. Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1042 (1990) (courts should defer to 
medical professionals' judgment concerning involuntary medication of prisoners). 
2901. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687-88 (1978) (comprehensive court order correcting 
many constitutional violations justified by inadequate compliance with prior court orders); Bounds 
v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 832-33 (1977) (court order requiring that inmates have access to legal 
research facilities justified); Tillery v. Owens, 907 F.2d 418, 430-31 (3d Cir. 1990) (court order 
requiring immediate cessation of double bunking prisoners justified by egregious conditions). 
2902. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. 
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there is a "valid, rational connection" between the regulation and the legiti-
mate interest advanced to justify it; (2) whether alternative means for exercis-
ing the asserted right remain available; (3) whether accommodation of the 
asserted right will adversely affect guards, other inmates, and allocation of 
prison resources generally; and (4) whether there is an obvious alternative to 
the regulation "that fully accommodates the prisoner's right at de minimis 
cost to valid penological interests. " 2903 The Court has rejected a "least re-
strictive alternative" test under which prison officials would be required to 
"set up and then shoot down every conceivable alternative method" of ac-
commodating the asserted right-2904 The existence of alternatives, however, 
may be evidence that the regulation is an unreasonable, "exaggerated re-
sponse" to prison concerns. 2905 
PRISONERS' SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS 
Right of Access to Courts. The Constitution guarantees prisoners the right 
of meaningful access to courts, 2906 and prison officials may not retaliate 
against prisoners who exercise their right of access.2907 In Bounds v. 
2903. /d. at 89-91. 
2904. /d. at 90; Thornburgh v. Abbott, 109 S. Ct. 1874, 1880 (1989) (rejecting least restrictive 
alternative test and adopting Turner reasonableness standard for regulations restricting publications 
sent to inmates). 
2905. Turner, 482 U.S. at 91. 
2906. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 824, 828 (1977) (prisoners have constitutional right to 
adequate, effective, and meaningful access to courts to challenge violations of constitutional rights); 
Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969) (prisoners' access to courts may not be denied or 
obstructed). 
2907. Compare Jackson v. Cain, 864 F.2d 1235, 1249 (5th Cir. 1989) (claim stated when material 
issue existed as to whether inmate was transferred to "punishment crew" in retaliation for utilizing 
prison grievance procedures); Harris v. Fleming, 839 F.2d 1232, 1236-38 (7th Cir. 1988) (allega-
tions that prisoner fired from two prison jobs within one week of remand of his suit against prison 
personnel, fired from third job day after refusing to settle pending lawsuit against prison officials, 
transferred two days later into cell with known homosexual inmate, transferred to different cell 
every six to eight weeks, and transferred back into general population, even though he had re-
quested special protection, sufficient to state claim of unconstitutional retaliation); Haley v. 
Dormire, 845 F.2d 1488, 1489-91 (8th Cir. 1988) (allegation that prison officials conspired to deny 
prisoner access to courts in retaliation for filing previous lawsuits by preventing him from using 
prison library, denying him legal materials and assistance, and requiring him to purchase writing 
paper when he had no money, sufficient to state claim); Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 
1138-39 (9th Cir. 1989) (allegation that officials labeled inmate "snitch" in effort to subject him to 
harm from other prisoners in retaliation for filing grievances sufficient to state claim); Smith v. 
Maschner, 899 F.2d 940, 949 (lOth Cir. 1990) (allegations that prisoner segregated immediately 
prior to hearings, witnesses and assistants transferred, and legal materials destroyed sufficient to 
state claim) and Wildberger v. Bracknell, 869 F.2d 1467, 1468 (lith Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (allega-
tion that disciplinary segregation was in retaliation for filing of grievances sufficient to state claim) 
with Gaut v. Sunn, 810 F.2d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (allegation that guard threatened 
prisoner with bodily harm to dissuade him from pursuing legal redress for beatings did not state 
claim for constitutional deprivation of right of access because threat to do act prohibited by Consti-
tution is not equivalent to doing act itself). 
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Smith, 2908 the Supreme Court held that the right of access imposes an affirm-
ative duty on prison officials to assist inmates in preparing and filing legal 
papers, either by establishing an adequate law library or by providing ade-
quate assistance from persons trained in the law.2909 However, prison offi-
cials are not required to provide both, as long as access is "meaningful."2910 
In order to successfully allege a constitutional deprivation, most courts re-
quire prisoners to demonstrate some actual injury resulting from a denial of 
access.2911 
2908. 430 u.s. 817 (1977). 
2909. /d. at 828; see Milton v. Morris, 767 F.2d 1443, 1447 (9th Cir. 1985) (denial of access to 
both law library and legal assistant violates right of access). It is not clear which resources a library 
must maintain to satisfy the right of access. Compare Blake v. Berman, 877 F.2d 145, 146-48 (1st 
Cir. 1989) (prisoner from Massachusetts, who was transferred to prison in Kansas that did not have 
adequate materials on Massachusetts law but did have clinical legal representation program, not 
denied access); Tyler v. Black, 811 F.2d 424, 429-31 (8th Cir. 1987) (library adequate because 
provided nearly complete sets of regional and federal reporters, state statutes, rules, digests, federal 
code and federal practice digests, when missing volumes and updates on order), cert. denied, 490 
U.S. 1027 (1989) and Lindquist v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 776 F.2d 851, 856 (9th Cir. 1985) 
(state prison library adequate, although failure to provide Shepard's Citations was questionable) 
with Morrow v. Harwell, 768 F.2d 619, 622-23 (5th Cir. 1985) (for access to be meaningful, prisoner 
must be furnished research tools necessary to effectively rebut authorities cited by adversary in 
responsive pleadings) and DeMallory v. Cullen, 855 F.2d 442, 446-48 (7th Cir. 1988) (claim of 
inadequate library resources sufficiently stated by inmate who had no appointed counsel and had 
access only to 1969 edition of state statutes and specifically requested law volumes). The Eleventh 
Circuit has held that the availability of a law library is sufficient to satisfy Bounds even if the 
majority of prisoners in a facility are functionally illiterate. See Hooks v. Wainwright, 775 F.2d 
1433, 1435-37 (11th Cir. 1985) (plan contemplating meaningful access through libraries sufficient 
despite 50% functional illiteracy rate), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 913 (1986). 
2910. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 832 ("legal access program need not include any particular element"); 
compare Lyons v. Powell, 838 F.2d 28, 32 (1st Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (prisoner with access to law 
library not constitutionally entitled to assistance from persons trained in the law); Childs v. Pelle-
grin, 822 F.2d 1382, 1384-85 (6th Cir. 1987) (denying prisoner access to law library, legal materials, 
and appointed counsel did not deny meaningful access when evidentiary hearing provided and judge 
gave prisoner his attention and benefit of his experience, provided him with opportunity to make 
record for use on appeal, and reached merits of case); Little v. Norris, 787 F.2d 1241, 1244 (8th Cir. 
1986) (limited access to law library and informal assistance of inmate writ writers provided mean-
ingful access); Lindquist v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 776 F.2d 851, 851-56 (9th Cir. 1985) 
(prison plan that provides law library and aid of inmate law clerks for illiterate and non-English 
speaking inmates constitutionally adequate) and Battle v. Anderson, 788 F.2d 1421, 1424-25 (lOth 
Cir. 1986) (furnishing of inmate law clerks provided meaningful access) with Valentine v. Beyer, 850 
F.2d 951, 956 (3d Cir. 1988) (prison official's plan to eliminate inmates' paralegal training group 
denied prisoners meaningful access to courts because plan forced inmates to rely on less competent 
paralegals in prison law library) and Morrow v. Harwell, 768 F.2d 619, 623 (5th Cir. 1985) (system 
allowing checkout of law books from weekly bookmobile and limited assistance from law students 
not meaningful access to courts). 
2911. Peterkin v. Jeffes, 855 F.2d 1021, 1041 (3d Cir. 1988) (death row inmates, who have lim-
ited access to prison law library materials and are prohibited from utilizing jailhouse lawyers or 
clinical programs, must meet actual injury standard to prove unconstitutional restraint on access to 
courts); Sands v. Lewis, 886 F.2d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 1989) (to prove constitutional violation 
prisoner must show actual injury from denial of use of 40-character memory typewriter and carbon 
paper); see White v. White, 886 F.2d 721, 723 (4th Cir. 1989) (no constitutional violation when 
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Courts will allow some restrictions on a prisoner's access to legal resources 
in order to accommodate legitimate administrative concerns, such as main-
taining security and internal order,2912 preventing the introduction of contra-
band,2913 preventing the domination of the library by regular users,2914 and 
observing budgetary constraints.2915 In the absence of a legitimate adminis-
prisoner's complaint failed to contain factual allegations tending to support bare assertion of depri-
vation by policy requiring nonindigent prisoners to pay cash for postage); Richardson v. McDon-
nell, 841 F.2d 120, 122 (5th Cir. 1988) (no constitutional violation when prisoner resubmitted 
habeas corpus writs without prejudice after prison officials had lost earlier copies in mail); Hossman 
v. Spradlin, 812 F.2d 1019, 1022 (7th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (no constitutional violation when 
prisoner made no allegations suggesting how denial of use of law library for six days denied him 
"meaningful access" or how destruction of his legal papers caused him harm). 
The Third Circuit uses an "actual injury" test in cases where prisoners challenge access to re-
sources other than legal assistance itself. Peterkin, 855 F.2d at 1041-42. Where the challenge in-
volves the right to legal assistance, the third circuit has held that the "actual injury" test is 
synonymous with the Bounds analysis. /d. 
2912. Compare Cookish v. Cunningham, 787 F.2d 1, 5-6 (lst Cir. 1986) (short-term denial of 
access to prison library permissible if required to maintain security and internal order); Caldwell v. 
Miller, 790 F.2d 589, 606 (7th Cir. 1986) (restrictions on library use as part of post-riot "lockdown" 
permissible); Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 138 (9th Cir. 1987) (no constitutional violation 
in requiring inmate to be escorted to law library rather than being able to use pass) and Solomon v. 
Zant, 888 F.2d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 1989) (policy prohibiting death row inmate from leaving cell 
block to meet attorney unless shaving requirements complied with sufficiently related to security 
interest) with DeMallory v. Cullen, 855 F.2d 442, 448 (7th Cir. 1988) (generalized security concerns 
insufficient to support restrictions preventing inmates in segregation from going to library, confer-
ring with inmate paralegals, participating in legal training program, and limiting them to checking 
out books by citation) and Ching v. Lewis, 895 F.2d 608, 610 (9th Cir. 1990) (prison policy denying 
prisoner contact visits and forcing him to communicate with attorney through hole in glass violated 
right to meaningful access). 
2913. See Howland v. Kilquist, 833 F.2d 639, 641-42 (7th Cir. 1987) (no violation of right of 
access when prison refused to deliver mail containing legal materials that were not marked privi-
leged and sent by prisoner's fiancee, when prisoner could have obtained documents from court or 
his attorney because legitimate concern that mail could contain contraband); O'Donnel v. Thomas, 
826 F.2d 788, 790 (8th Cir. 1987) (jail officials' opening of mail in course of normal security screen-
ing did not violate right of access, even though envelopes contained legal materials when envelopes 
not clearly identified as privileged legal communications because legitimate concern that mail could 
contain contraband); Baker v. Piggott, 833 F.2d 1539, 1540 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (pri~­
oner's right of access not violated when officials confiscated prisoner's contraband savings of $3 ~ 7, 
although money intended to defray expense of hiring private attorney), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1241 
(1988). 
2914. See Flittie v. Solem, 827 F.2d 276, 280 (8th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (prisoner, who used 
library on average three days per week, not denied meaningful access by regulation that allowed 
him to use prison law library only after prisoners who were not "regular users" had completed their 
work, because regulation necessary to prevent domination of system by regular users and prisoner 
could show no prejudice from regulation). 
2915. Gaines v. Lane, 790 F.2d 1299, 1308 (7th Cir. 1986) (prison authorities may reasonably 
attempt to balance right of prisoners to use mails with prison budgetary considerations); compare 
Gittens v. Sullivan, 848 F.2d 389, 390 (2d Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (denial of unlimited free mailing 
did not violate prisoner's right of access when prison officials provided $1.10 per week for stamps 
and an additional advance of $36 for legal mail postage) with Smith v. Erickson, 884 F.2d 1108, 
1109-11 (8th Cir. 1989) (refusal to provide free postage or supplies for legal mail to indigent inmates 
and policy requiring inmates to use envelopes from prison canteen violated inmates' right of access 
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trative concern, however, prisoners may not be hindered from gaining access 
to the judicial process.2916 Inmates who have been denied access to legal 
materials have not necessarily suffered a constitutional deprivation when 
they are confined for only a short period of time. 29 17 
Retained Freedoms of Speech, Religion, and Association. Prison officials 
may not interfere with a prisoner's exercise of first amendment rights unless 
such interference is reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest,2918 
because inmates must be provided basic material to draft and mail legal documents and prison-
canteen-only-envelope policy advanced no specific penological interest). 
2916. Compare Wolffv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 578 (1974) (prison officials may not prevent 
inmates from helping other inmates with civil rights petitions unless state provides constitutionally 
adequate alternative access to courts); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 419-22 (1973) (prison 
rule banning use by prisoners' attorneys of law students and legal professionals unjustifiable restric-
tion on right of access); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 490 (1969) (prison officials may not pre-
vent inmates from helping other inmates with habeas corpus petitions); Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 
548-49 (1941) (prison officials may not prescreen prisoners' legal documents before they are filed 
with court); Simmons v. Dickhaut, 804 F.2d 182, 184 (1st Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (allegations that 
prison officials ignored multiple requests to retrieve legal materials needed for pending case from 
previous institution and that legal materials confiscated or destroyed stated claim of inadequate 
access to court); Morello v. James, 810 F.2d 344, 347 (2d Cir. 1987) (allegation that state prison 
officials confiscated pro se legal materials prepared for appeal of criminal convictions stated claim); 
Carter v. Hutto, 781 F.2d 1028, 1031-32 (4th Cir. 1986) (allegation that prison officials confiscated 
and destroyed legal materials stated claim); Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1126 (5th Cir. 
1986) (allegation that prisoner in administrative segregation allowed only two or three law books 
per day stated claim); Vaiandingham v. B01jorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1139-40 (9th Cir. 1989) (allega-
tion that inmate did not receive legal materials requested from library stated claim) and Gramegna 
v. Johnson, 846 F.2d 675, 676-78 (11th Cir. 1988) (prison's policy of allowing "sizeable bundle" of 
mail to accumulate prior to delivery violated prisoner's right of access when it resulted in prisoner 
not receiving notice of denial of petition in sufficient time to make timely appeal) with Abdul-Akbar 
v. Watson, 901 F.2d 329, 333-34 (3d Cir. 1990) (where prisoner abused judicial process by filing 43 
civil rights claims in seven years, court justified in entering injunction prohibiting filing of future 
claims without leave of court). 
2917. See Jones v. Smith, 784 F.2d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 1986) (denial of access to legal advance 
sheets during 30-day administrative confinement found de minimis); Magee v. Waters, 810 F.2d 
451, 452 (4th Cir. 1987) (no unconstitutional denial of access when prisoners in short-term holding 
facility allowed limited access to library with limited contents); Hooten v. Jenne, 786 F.2d 692, 697 
(5th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (local jail authorities not required to furnish access to courts if, because 
of brevity of incarceration, not reasonably expected that inmates would have sufficient time to peti-
tion courts). But see Owens v. Maschner, 811 F.2d 1365, 1366 (lOth Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (pris-
oner's allegation that he was denied access to courts and to legal documents while in 20-day solitary 
confinement stated claim of constitutional deprivation). 
2918. Thornburgh v. Abbott, 109 S. Ct. 1874, 1881 (1989); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 
(1987) ("when a prison regulation impinges on inmates' [first amendment] rights, the regulation is 
valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests"); Jones v. North Carolina Prison-
ers' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 129-30 (1977) (first amendment rights subject to restrictions 
legitimately required by confinement); see Gibbs v. King, 779 F.2d 1040, 1045 (5th Cir.) (prisoner's 
first amendment rights not violated by regulation prohibiting disrespect or cursing at other inmates 
or employees when purpose to prevent escalation of tension in prison), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1117 
(1986); Espinoza v. Wilson, 814 F.2d 1093, 1098 (6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (denial of access to 
homosexual publications permissible when such materials posed security problem); Woods v. 
O'Leary, 890 F.2d 883, 885-88 (7th Cir. 1989) (prisoner's first amendment rights not violated by 
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nor may prison officials retaliate against a prisoner for exercising first amend-
ment rights. 2919 
Inmates have the right to send and receive information, subject to limits 
"reasonably related" to legitimate penal interests. 2920 Incoming correspon-
regulation prohibiting mailing of religious publication because regulation applied to all inmate-run 
business ventures); Garza v. Carlson, 877 F.2d 14, 16-17 (8th Cir. 1989) (denial of access to group 
prayer for prisoners in administrative segregation not violation of Jewish inmate's rightS when ac-
tion taken out of legitimate security concern; threat to force feed inmate on religious hunger strike 
not violation of constitutional rights because prisoner health legitimate penological concern); 
Harper v. Wallingford, 877 F.2d 728, 733 (9th Cir. 1989) (no first amendment violation when pris-
oner's mail from organization advocating consensual sexual relations between adult and juvenile 
males withheld out of concern for prison security and inmate rehabilitation). 
2919. See Brooks v. Andolina, 826 F.2d 1266, 1268 (3d Cir. 1987) (prison official's interest in 
prison security does not justify punishment of prisoner for writing NAACP to complain about 
behavior of guards); Jackson v. Cain, 864 F.2d 1235, 1249 (5th Cir. 1989) (claim stated when mate-
rial issue existed as to whether inmate transferred to "punishment crew" in retaliation for utilizing 
prison grievance procedures); Murphy v. Missouri Dep't of Corrections, 769 F.2d 502, 503 (8th Cir. 
1985) (per curiam) (allegations that prisoner transferred to maximum security prison in retaliation 
for religious beliefs stated claim for violation of first amendment rights); Wildberger v. Bracknell, 
869 F.2d 1467, 1468 (11th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (inmate allegation that disciplinary segregation 
was in retaliation for filing grievances sufficient to state claim); cf. Meriwether v. Coughlin, 879 
F.2d 1037, 1042-44 (2d Cir. 1989) (jury could reasonably find that prisoners transferred and beaten 
in retaliation for attendance at grievance meeting). 
2920. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 48, 91, 93 (1987); Thornburgh v. Abbott, 109 S. Ct. 1874, 1881 
(1989); compare Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 550-51 (1979) (regulation prohibiting receipt of 
books from sources other than publishers, book clubs, or bookstores held constitutional because of 
possibility that contraband being smuggled in hardbound books from unidentified sources); Wolffv. 
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 574-77 (1974) (opening of prisoner's mail justified by legitimate need of 
prison officials to search for contraband); Guyer v. Beard, 907 F.2d 1424, 1428 (3d Cir. 1990) (order 
requiring prisoner to sign limited power of attorney form authorizing Warden to receive and open 
court orders and notices justified by legitimate need of prison officials to search for contraband); 
Hernandez v. Estelle, 788 F.2d 1154, 1155-56 (5th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (prison official's refusal 
to distribute bilingual revolutionary publication during period of prison turmoil justified); Burton v. 
Nault, 902 F.2d 4, 5 (6th Cir.) (opening of letter to prisoner's attorney justified when letter found 
next to prisoner after attempted suicide), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 198 ( 1990); Martin v. Tyson, 845 
F.2d 1451, 1456-57 (7th Cir.) (per curiam) (no constitutional violation in opening and inspecting 
pretrial detainee's mail because inspection of personal mail for contraband serves legitimate security 
purpose), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 863 (1988); Holloway v. Pigman, 884 F.2d 365, 367 (8th Cir. 1989) 
(prison regulations that did not require notice. to inmates on punitive status of receipt of mail and 
did not provide opportunity to protest mail returned to sender for violations of prison regulations 
not constitutional violation); Mann v. Adams, 846 F.2d 589, 590-91 (9th Cir.) (per curiam) (mail 
sent to prisoners from public agencies, public officials, recognized civil rights groups, and news 
media not entitled to special deference ordinarily given to legal correspondence in face of prison 
security concerns; thus, prisoners do not have right to be present when such mail is opened), cert. 
denied, 488 U.S. 898 (1988) and Smith v. Maschner, 899 F.2d 940, 944 (lOth Cir. 1990) (no consti-
tutional violation when prison officials returned incoming mail, labels, and stickers to sender; acci-
dental opening of mail from IRS, absent evidence of improper motive or interference with right to 
counsel, not a constitutional violation) with Farid v. Smith, 850 F.2d 917, 925-26 (2d Cir. 1988) 
(confiscation of two Tarot books and home-made cassette tape mailed to prisoner constitutional 
violation when prison officials offered no evidence that materials posed legitimate threat to secur-
ity); Brooks v. Seiter, 779 F.2d 1177, 1180-81 (6th Cir. 1985) (magazine subscription constitutes 
form of inmate correspondence and cannot be curtailed in absence of legitimate penal interest) and 
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dence, whether from other inmates or non-inmates, may be rejected if "detri-
mental to the security, good order, or discipline of the institution or if [it] 
might facilitate criminal activity."2921 Thus, inmate-to-inmate correspon-
dence may be banned completely to protect legitimate security interests.2922 
Outgoing correspondence usually poses no threat to internal prison security 
or other legitimate penological interests and therefore may not be 
prohibited. 2923 
The first amendment also affords prisoners some freedom of communica-
tion and association, which may be curtailed by legitimate penal con-
cerns. 29 24 Prison officials must afford prisoners reasonable opportunities to 
Sizemore v. Williford, 829 F.2d 608, 610 (7th Cir. 1987) (allegation that prison officials repeatedly 
and intentionally withheld unobjectionable reading material, including sports and entertainment 
periodicals and daily newspaper, stated claim of first amendment deprivation). 
2921. Abbott, 109 S. Ct. at 1883. Federal regulations prohibit inmates from receiving hardcover 
books and publications from sources other than the publisher, a book club, or a bookstore. 28 
C.F.R. § 540.71(a) (1989). Inmates may receive softcover publications from any source, however. 
/d. The Warden of a facility may reject an incoming publication only if it is detrimental to the 
"security, good order, or discipline" of the facility or if it facilitates criminal activity. /d. 
§ 570.71(b). The Warden may reject incoming legal materials only if there is a compelling reason in 
the interest of "institution security, good order, or discipline." /d. § 543.ll(d) (emphasis added). 
2922. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 91, 93 (1987) (prison officials may prohibit correspondence 
between inmates at different facilities because of legitimate security concerns relating to potential 
for communication of escape plans and other violent acts); see Vester v. Rogers, 795 F.2d 1179, 
1183 (4th Cir. 1986) (prison officials may prohibit correspondence between inmates in different 
prisons because it only limits and does not deny prisoners right to free speech), cert. denied, 482 
u.s. 916 (1987). 
2923. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 414-16 (1974) (regulations prohibiting inmate corre-
spondence containing undue complaints or magnified grievances invalid because not necessary to 
further government interest); see Thornburgh v. Abbott, 109 S. Ct. 1874, 1881 (1989) (limiting 
Martinez to outgoing correspondence). In Martinez, the Court held that restrictions on outgoing 
correspondence are valid only if they are "generally necessary" to further a valid penological inter-
est. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 414. In Abbott, the Court rejected the proposition that the Martinez 
standard imposed a least restrictive means test. Abbott, 109 S. Ct. at 1880. In addition, Abbott 
rejected the use of a separate standard for regulations implicating the rights of non-inmates to 
receive correspondence. /d. at 1879 n.9. The Martinez Court indicated that only outgoing corre-
spondence concerning escape plans, ongoing criminal activity, or threats of blackmail pose a threat 
to prison security justifying censorship. 416 U.S. at 412-13. 
2924. See Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 132-33 (1977) 
(rights associated with promoting unionization in prison give way to interests in preserving order 
and authority); Hadden v. Howard, 713 F.2d 1003, 1006-07 (3d Cir. 1983) (no constitutional pro-
tection for prisoner's maliciously false complaints about prison guards); Thome v. Jones, 765 F.2d 
1270, 1272-75 (5th Cir. 1985) (denial of visitation privileges between inmate and mother justified by 
security concerns based on reliable information that inmate receiving narcotics through visiting 
room and mother's refusal to submit to strip search prior to visit), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 
(1986); Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 420 (6th Cir.) (prison officials justified in denying visita-
tion rights to inmate's girlfriend when she violated prison rules), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 845 (1984); 
Rios v. Lane, 812 F.2d 1032, 1034-37 (7th Cir.) (imposition of disciplinary sanctions against pris-
oner who communicated revolutionary slogans to known gang member justified by compelling need 
to contain and eliminate organized gang activity), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1001 (1987); Benzel v. 
Crammer, 869 F.2d 1105, 1109 (8th Cir.) (prison telephone policy that prohibits inmates in segrega-
tion unit from calling non-attorney, non-relative males serves legitimate penological interests of 
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exercise their religious freedom, subject to limits reasonably related to legiti-
mate institutional concerns. In O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 2925 the Supreme 
Court upheld a prison regulation prohibiting prisoners who worked outside 
prison buildings from returning to those buildings during the day, even 
though the regulation had the effect of prohibiting some Muslim inmates 
from attending services, because ( 1) the regulation was rationally related to 
legitimate concerns of rehabilitation, institutional order, and security; (2) no 
ready alternatives to the regulations existed; (3) prisoners retained some free-
dom of religious expression, being allowed to celebrate Muslim holidays; and 
(4) accommodation of prisoners' practices would require extra supervision, 
threaten prison security, and create perceptions of favoritism. 2926 A prisoner 
security and rehabilitation and does not violate first amendment rights), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 244 
(1989); Evans v. Johnson, 808 F.2d 1427, 1428 (lith Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (visitation privileges 
subject to discretion of prison authorities if policies serve legitimate penolopcal objectives); Robin-
son v. Palmer, 841 F.2d 1151, 1156-57 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (prison sanction permanently banning 
prisoner's wife from visiting after she was caught attempting to smuggle marijuana into prison did 
not violate first amendment rights because sanction reasonable response to threat of future smug-
gling and prisoner had other ways to communicate with wife). 
2925. 482 u.s. 342 (1987). 
2926. ld. at 350-53; see Benjamin v. Coughlin, 905 F.2d 571, 577-78 (2d Cir. 1990) (requirement 
that religious congregation be supervised by non-inmate spiritual leader served valid penological 
interest in security and did not violate free exercise rights of Rastafarian inmate); Cooper v. Tard, 
855 F.2d 125, 128-30 (3d Cir. 1988) (prohibition against unsupervised group activities serves valid 
penological interest in security and does not violate free exercise rights of Muslim inmates who wish 
to engage in unsupervised group prayer); Dettmer v. Landon, 799 F.2d 929, 932-34 (4th Cir. 1986) 
(regulation denying prisoner access to worship materials, such as white robe, candles, incense, 
kitchen timer, and small hollow statue, upheld because of legitimate security concerns and difficulty 
of supervising prisoner's use of objects in religious rites), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1007 (1987); Mumin 
v. Phelps, 857 F.2d 1055, 1057-58 (5th Cir. 1988) (refusal to transport Muslim inmates from out-
camps to main building for weekly services not impermissible limitation on right to freedom of 
religion when decision content neutral and based on legitimate concern regarding resource alloca-
tion and security); Pollock v. Marshall, 845 F.2d 656, 658-60 (6th Cir.) (forcibly cutting prisoner's 
hair did not violate free exercise rights, even though prisoner's Lakota American Indian religion 
believes hair is sacred and should not be cut, because regulation served legitimate penological objec-
tives, including permitting quick identification of prisoners, removing place to hide contraband, 
preventing sanitary problems and homosexual attacks, and reducing contact between prisoners and 
guards), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 987 (1988); Johnson-Bey v. Lane, 863 F.2d 1308, 1310-11 (7th Cir. 
1988) (because of valid security concerns, prison not required to allow either ex-convict or current 
inmate to conduct religious services; however, prison officials may not arbitrarily obstruct inmates' 
religious observance on basis of sect to which prisoner belongs); Iron Eyes v. Henry, 907 F.2d 810, 
816 (8th Cir. 1990) (grooming regulation requiring all prisoners to wear hair above collar did not 
violate free exercise rights of Sioux inmate because regulation designed to further security interest); 
Reimers v. Oregon, 863 F.2d 630, 631-32 (9th Cir. 1988) (no first amendment violation when minis-
ter, with whom prisoner preferred to worship, terminated, because free exercise clause does not 
grant right to visit clergyman of choice outside prison, nor to have clergyman of choice provided 
within prison); McCorkle v. Johnson, 881 F.2d 993, 995 (lith Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (denial of 
inmate's request for access to Satanic materials did not violate free exercise rights because of vio-
lence and potential disruption inherent in Satanic worship). 
Prisoners have, nevertheless, successfully stated claims of unconstitutional infringement on their 
exercise of religion. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972) (per curiam) (Buddhist prisoner 
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asserting her right of religious liberty must establish that her beliefs are sin-
cerely held2927 and religious in nature. 2928 
Retained Rights Related to Searches, Seizures, and Personal Privacy. 
Although prisoners retain certain fundamental rights of personal privacy, 2929 
denied use of chapel available to fellow prisoners and prohibited from corresponding with religious 
advisor alleged palpable discrimination); Benjamin v. Coughlin, 905 F.2d 571, 577 (2d Cir. 1990) 
(requirement that all male inmates receive haircut upon entry of prison violated free exercise rights 
of Rastafarian inmate when pulling hair back in pony tail adequately accommodated penological 
interest in prisoner identification); Beck v. Lynaugh, 842 F.2d 759, 761 (5th Cir. 1988) (excluding 
all segregated prisoners from chapel services unconstitutional because not all such prisoners poten-
tial troublemakers); Whitney v. Brown, 882 F.2d 1068, 1077-78 (6th Cir. 1989) (prison policy that 
eliminated Jewish inmates' intercomplex travel to weekly Sabbath services and annual Passover 
Seders impermissible infringement upon free exercise rights); Hunafa v. Murphy, 907 F.2d 46, 48 
(7th Cir. 1990) (allegation that prison policy requiring serving meals containing pork to inmates in 
disciplinary segregation violated free exercise rights of Islamic prisoner raised sufficient factual is-
sues to avoid summary judgment); Salaam v. Lockhart, 905 F.2d 1168, 1173-74 (8th Cir. 1990) 
(inmate who changed name after incarceration upon conversion to Muslim faith entitled to delivery 
of mail under that name, and addition of Muslim name to clothing, because use of "alk/a" avail-
able), cert. denied, IllS. Ct. 677 (1991). 
Prison officials need not provide all religious groups with identical facilities for worship. See 
Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 n.2 (1972) (special chapel or place of worship need not be provided 
for every faith regardless of size); Butler-Bey v. Frey, 811 F.2d 449,451-52 (8th Cir. 1987) (even if 
prohibited from using chapel, religious group had access to comparable prison facilities and thus 
inmates afforded reasonable opportunity to exercise religious freedom); cj Thompson v. Kentucky, 
712 F.2d 1078, 1080-82 (6th Cir. 1983) (Muslim prisoners, constituting only 25 of approximately 
190 inmates using chapel, need not be given equal time in prison chapel). 
2927. See Farid v. Smith, 850 F.2d 917, 926 (2d Cir. 1988) (when prisoner did not allege or 
submit proof that sincerely held religious beliefs mandated use of Tarot cards, confiscating Tarot 
cards did not violate free exercise rights); Sourbeer v. Robinson, 791 F.2d 1094, 1102 (3d Cir. 1986) 
(prisoner's failure to attend religious services while in general prison population and failure to desig-
nate spiritual adviser while in administrative segregation supported inference of insincerity that 
justified dismissal of claim), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1032 (1987); Reed v. Faulkner, 842 F.2d 960,963 
(7th Cir. 1988) (dictum) (evidence of Rastafarian prisoner's eating meat and shaving, both of which 
prohibited by his religion, relevant to whether religious beliefs sincerely held); McElyea v. Babbitt, 
833 F.2d 196, 198 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (dictum) (appropriate to deny special diet if inmate 
not sincere in religious beliefs); Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1197-98 (lOth Cir. 1989) (per 
curiam) (no violation of freedom of religion when prisoner objected to AIDS test on unspecified 
religious grounds and was threatened with disciplinary segregation if he did not submit), cert. de-
nied, II 0 S. Ct. 871 ( 1990). 
2928. Compare Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1030, 1036 (3d Cir. 1981) (although pris-
oner's beliefs were truly held, court found that MOVE organization not religion), cert. denied, 456 
U.S. 908 (1982) with Dettmer v. Landon, 799 F.2d 929, 931-32 (4th Cir. 1986) (church based on 
witchcraft occupied place in lives of its members parallel to that of more conventional religions and 
thus entitled to first amendment protection), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1007 (1987); cj Martinelli v. 
Dugger, 817 F.2d 1499, 1503-05 (lith Cir. 1987) (although prisoner must be sincere in religious 
beliefs, no requirement that belief be held by majority of believers in particular religion in order to 
have first amendment protection), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1012 (1988). 
2929. Compare Monmouth County Correctional Inst'l Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 344-49 
(3d Cir. 1987) (prison policy requiring court order before permitting elective non-therapeutic abor-
tions unconstitutionally interfered with prisoners' right to have abortions and constituted deliberate 
indifference to serious medical need in violation of eighth amendment), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1006 
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their cells can be searched at random without violating the fourth amend-
ment2930 because they have no reasonable expectation of privacy within their 
cells.2931 Further, the seizure by prison officials of an inmate's property does 
not constitute a fourth amendment violation if the seizure serves legitimate 
institutional interests. 2932 
Courts will closely scrutinize the reasonableness of strip searches and body 
cavity searches.2933 The constitutionality of these searches will be deter-
mined by balancing the state's need for a particular search against the extent 
(1988) and Kent v. Johnson, 821 F.2d 1220, 1226 (6th Cir. 1987) (prisoner's challenge to practice of 
according female guards unrestricted access to all areas of housing unit stated claim under fourth 
amendment because "common experience ... leads inexorably to the conclusion that there must be 
a fundamental right to be free from forced exposure of one's person to strangers of the opposite sex 
when not reasonably necessary for some legitimate, overriding reason") with U.S. v. Willoughby, 
860 F.2d 15, 20-21 (2d Cir. 1988) (monitoring and taping of inmate telephone calls did not violate 
constitutional rights when signs posted notifying inmates of monitoring and inmate signed acknowl-
edgement of prison's monitoring policy), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1033 (1989); Southerland v. 
Thigpen, 784 F.2d 713, 715-17 (5th Cir. 1986) (goals of penal system outweigh female inmate's 
interest in breastfeeding her child); Goodwin v. Turner, 908 F.2d 1395, 1400 (8th Cir. 1990) (prison 
prohibition on inmate procreation, denying inmate opportunity to artificially inseminate his non-
inmate wife, not constitutional violation); Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 333-34 (9th Cir. 
1988) (no violation of prisoner's privacy rights when female officers able to view body cavity 
searches) and Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1196 (lOth Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (non-consensual 
AIDS test did not violate prisoner's fourth amendment rights because prison's interest in respond-
ing to AIDS outweighs invasion of privacy). 
The Court has also upheld the right of prisoners to marry. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 97-98 
(1987) (although prison officials may regulate time and circumstances of marriage ceremony itself, 
prohibiting inmates from marrying other inmates or civilians, unless superintendent determined 
"compelling reasons," exaggerated response to security concerns and not reasonably related to legit-
imate penological objectives). However, the right to marry is subject to substantial restrictions as a 
result of incarceration and the pursuit of legitimate correctional goals. /d. at 95. 
2930. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530 (1984). But cf. U.S. v. Cohen, 796 F.2d 20, 22-24 (2d 
Cir. 1986) (when purpose of search is to uncover criminal evidence, not to further institutional 
security, prisoner's fourth amendment rights violated by warrantless search), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 
854 (1987). 
2931. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 530. The Hudson Court reasoned that the need for institutional secur-
ity outweighed the prisoner's privacy interest within his cell. Id. at 527. The Court indicated that 
prisoners would retain an action for cruel and unusual punishment if cell searches are conducted in 
a particularly egregious manner. /d. at 530. The Court added that while prison officials have the 
power to conduct seizures, this "does not mean that an inmate's property can be destroyed with 
impunity." /d. The Court suggested, however, that a prisoner's redress for such wrongful destruc-
tion lies with administrative grievance procedures or state remedies, not the fourth amendment. /d. 
at 530 n.9. 
2932. Id at 528 n.8; see Spence v. Farrier, 807 F.2d 753, 755 (8th Cir. 1986) (prison security 
interests concerning unauthorized use of narcotics justified policy requiring periodic urinalysis); 
Davis v. Bucher, 853 F.2d 718, 720-21 (9th Cir. 1988) (no violation of inmate's right to privacy 
when officer removed nude photos of inmate's wife from inmate's possessions, displayed them to at 
least two other inmates, and subsequently made derogatory remarks about photos); Rodriguez-
Mora v. Baker, 792 F.2d 1524, 1526 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (seizure of prisoner's ring during 
routine inventory search does not implicate fourth amendment rights). 
2933. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559-60 (1979) (court sensitive to degree to which such 
searches invade personal privacy of inmates and may prove abusive). 
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of the invasion suffered by the prisoner.2934 
Retained Rights Related to Living Conditions, Disciplinary Treatment, and 
Medical Care. The eighth amendment protects prisoners against cruel and 
unusual punishment during confinement.2935 Cruel and unusual punishment 
involves "the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,"2936 but the 
Supreme Court has stated that harsh conditions and rough disciplinary treat-
ment are part of the price that convicted individuals must pay for their of-
fenses against society.2937 Therefore, the actions of prison officials will not 
constitute cruel and unusual punishment if they further legitimate penal 
interests. 2938 
2934. /d. at 559 ("courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in 
which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted"); 
compare Hay v. Waldron, 834 F.2d 481, 486 (5th Cir. 1987) (strip search policy requiring in-cell 
visual body cavity search each time administrative segregation inmate enters or leaves cell justified 
because many administrative segregation inmates violent or potential victims of violence); Bruscino 
v. Carlson, 854 F.2d 162, 164-65 (7th Cir. 1988) (prison policy of subjecting inmates returning to 
cells to rectal searches not unconstitutional when body cavity searches continued to turn up "aston-
ishing quantity" of contraband, including knives and hacksaw blades, and statistical evidence sug-
gested that amount of violence at prison had declined since institution of policy), cert. denied, 109 S. 
Ct. 3193 (1989); Franklin v. Lockhart, 883 F.2d 654, 656 (8th Cir. 1989) (policy of visual body 
cavity strip searches of inmates on punitive status, in administrative segregation, and in need of 
protection, held reasonable because of security concerns) and Rickman v. Avaniti, 854 F.2d 327, 
328 (9th Cir. 1988) (maintaining prison safety and preventing introduction of contraband into 
prison justify visual strip and body cavity searches of administrative segregation inmates when en-
tering or leaving their cells) with Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 418 (7th Cir.) (transsexual 
inmate's allegations of strip searches before guards and other inmates for purpose of "calculated 
harassment unrelated to prison needs" stated claim of eighth amendment violation), cert. denied, 
484 U.S. 935 (1987) and Tribble v. Gardner, 860 F.2d 321, 325-26 (9th Cir.) (digital rectal searches 
conducted for punitive purposes violated prisoner's constitutional rights), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 
1075 (1989). 
2935. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The eighth amendment is also the appropriate standard for 
reviewing the conditions of pretrial detainees. For further discussion, see Rights Retained by Pre-
trial Detainees in this part. 
2936. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981); cj Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 954-56 
(6th Cir. 1987) (jury instruction that verbal abuse, harassment, or arbitrariness in dealing with 
inmates or their property amounts to cruel and unusual punishment "grossly overinclusive"). 
2937. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986); see Battle v. Anderson, 788 F.2d 1421, 1426-
27 (lOth Cir. 1986) (courts must remember that conditions to be evaluated involve "large, confined 
population of convicted felons, not a nursery school"); cj Wilson v. Lynaugh, 878 F.2d 846, 849 
(5th Cir.) (dictum) (exposure to environmental tobacco smoke not cruel and unusual punishment 
because eighth amendment does not protect against conditions causing mere discomfort or incon-
venience), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 417 (1989). 
2938. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346-47; compare Pressly v. Gregory, 831 F.2d 514,517-18 (4th Cir. 
1987) (coercive force used against prisoner resisting efforts to handcuff him not constitutional viola-
tion, especially when medical examination conducted next day revealed no evidence of injury); Mar-
tin v. Tyson, 845 F.2d 1451, 1456 (7th Cir.) (per curiam) (refusing to permit inmate to exercise 
outdoors did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment when inmate faced criminal charges for 
prior escape and therefore posed security risk, no exercise facilities were located outside, and inmate 
had enough room for exercise inside own cell), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 863 (1988); Knight v. Armon-
trout, 878 F.2d 1093, 1095-96 (8th Cir. 1989) (no eighth amendment violation when inmates were 
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Living conditions inside prisons must not fall below a constitutional mini-
mum. Prison officials must provide inmates with adequate food and safe, 
sanitary shelter.2939 Prison overcrowding may rise to the level of cruel and 
unusual punishment. 2940 In Rhodes v. Chapman, 2941 the Supreme Court re-
jected the use of mechanical rules for determining whether overcrowding vio-
in segregation for 13 days longer than 10-day disciplinary time, because excess time due to lack of 
beds and not disciplinary); Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 336 (9th Cir. 1988) (use of"taser 
gun" to force inmate to submit to legitimate strip search does not constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment); Bailey v. Shillinger, 828 F.2d 651, 653 (lOth Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (transfer of 
prisoner who had murdered another inmate to maximum security unit segregated from prison's 
general population and allowance of only one hour of outdoor exercise per week did not violate 
eighth amendment rights) and Brown v. Smith, 813 F.2d 1187, 1189-90 (lith Cir. 1987) (per 
curiam) (prison guard's use of riot stick against prisoner's neck so that head pinned against wall, in 
response to prisoner's refusal to return to cell, not cruel and unusual punishment, because use of 
force necessary to get prisoner into cell and resulting injury minimal) with Jackson v. Cain, 864 
F.2d 1235, 1247 (5th Cir. 1989) (inmate stated eighth amendment claim when material issue existed 
as to whether prison officials knowingly assigned him to work detail that would aggravate serious 
medical ailment); Kent v. Johnson, 821 F.2d 1220, 1227-28 (6th Cir. 1987) (allegations that female 
guards repeatedly watched prisoner in states of undress without legitimate penological interest 
stated eighth amendment claim); Lewis v. Lane, 816 F.2d 1165, 1171 (7th Cir. 1987) (prisoner's 
allegation that guards would regularly bang on bars to harass inmates stated claim for constitu-
tional deprivation, even though prison officials claimed procedure necessary to test strength of bars, 
because eighth amendment implicated if officials use otherwise legitimate security measure in man-
ner designed to harass prisoners) and Fruit v. Norris, 905 F.2d 1147, 1150-51 (8th Cir. 1990) (forc-
ing inmates to work in wet-well portion of prison's sewage lift-pump station without protective 
clothing and equipment violated inmates' eighth amendment rights). 
2939. Compare Corselli v. Coughlin, 842 F.2d 23, 27 (2d Cir. 1988) (allegation that prisoner 
exposed to sub-freezing temperatures for three months in fall and winter because of large empty 
windows in cellblock stated claim of cruel and unusual punishment); Beck v. Lynaugh, 842 F.2d 
759, 760-61 (5th Cir. 1988) (allegations that from November through April prison authorities failed 
to replace broken windows in segregation unit, rain water collected on floor in puddles, and no 
blankets or coats given to prisoners to cope with sub-freezing temperatures stated claim of cruel and 
unusual punishment); Johnson v. Pelker, 891 F.2d 136, 139 (7th Cir. 1989) (allegations that pris-
oner placed in segregation unit for three days without running water and in which feces smeared on 
walls sufficient to state claim of cruel and unusual punishment) and Howard v. Adkinson, 887 F.2d 
134, 136-37 (8th Cir. 1989) (eighth amendment violated where inmate placed in cell covered with 
human waste and denied cleaning supplies and laundry service for two-year period) with Wilson v. 
Lynaugh, 878 F.2d 846, 849 (5th Cir.) (dictum) (no eighth amendment violation when inmate 
claimed exposure to environmental tobacco smoke constituted health threat), cert. denied, 110 S. 
Ct. 417 (1989); Wilson v. Seiter, 893 F.2d 861, 865 (6th Cir.) (claims of exposure to temperatures as 
high as 95 degrees, housing mentally ill inmates with other inmates, and double bunking insufficient 
to establish eighth amendment violation), cert. granted, Ill S. Ct. 41 (1990) (No. 89-7376); Givens 
v. Jones, 900 F.2d 1229, 1234 (8th Cir. 1990) (no eighth amendment violation when noise and 
fumes caused by remodeling of prison alleged to give rise to inmate's migraine headaches) and 
Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 641 (9th Cir. 1989) (allegations of slippery floors and dried beans 
served for meals did not state claim of cruel and unusual punishment). 
2940. Compare Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347-50 (1981) (double ceiling at prison hous-
ing 38% more inmates than its design capacity not cruel and unusual punishment) with Hutto v. 
Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 682, 687 (1978) (confinement of an average of four, and sometimes as many 
as lO or ll prisoners in 8-by-10 foot cell for more than 30 days in punitive isolation constituted 
cruel and unusual punishment). 
2941. 452 u.s. 337 (1981). 
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lates the eighth amendment. 2942 Instead, courts must examine the totality of 
the conditions under which inmates live.2943 Double ceiling, by itself, does 
not make prison conditions cruel or unusual.2944 
The eighth amendment also places certain affirmative duties on prison offi-
cials. Failure to provide adequate medical care amounting to a "deliberate 
indifference" to prisoners' needs violates the eighth amendment. 294s Both 
failure to meet an adequate standard of care2946 and failure to provide ade-
2942. /d. at 346-47 (no static test can determine whether conditions of confinement constitute 
cruel and unusual punishment). 
2943. /d. at 347 (prison conditions, "alone or in combination, may deprive inmates of minimal 
civilized measure of life's necessities"); compare Tillery v. Owens, 907 F.2d 418,427 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(double ceiling constituted eighth amendment violation when record indicated almost every element 
of prison plant and provision of services fell below constitutional minimum) with Hassine v. Jellies, 
846 F.2d 169, 172-75 (3d Cir. 1988) (no constitutional violation when prison provided basic necessi-
ties, although prison population exceeded design capacity by 25%, prisoners subjected to double 
bunking for indeterminate duration in cells designed for single occupancy, close proximity of in-
mates caused increase in rapes and other violent assaults, growth in prison population not coun-
tered by increase in staff, and persistent dampness caused by leaking roof and poorly ventilated cell 
created health risk); Wilson v. Seiter, 893 F.2d 861, 865 (6th Cir. 1990) (double bunked inmates 
having only 50 square feet of living space not exposed to cruel and unusual punishment when 
inmates had access to television, lounge, gymnasium, yard, weight room, billiards table and library), 
cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 41 (1990) (No. 89-7376); Hamm v. DeKalb County, 774 F.2d 1567, 1575-
76 (11th Cir. 1985) (totality of conditions at prison, including overcrowding and unsanitary food, 
did not amount to constitutional violation), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1096 (1986) and Inmates of 
Occoquan v. Barry, 844 F.2d 828, 839 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (if food, shelter, health care and personal 
security provided, eighth amendment satisfied). 
2944. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. at 347-50; see Wilson v. Seiter, 893 F.2d 861, 865 (6th Cir. 
1990) (double bunked inmates having only 50 square feet of living space not exposed to cruel and 
unusual punishment where inmates had access to television, lounge, gymnasium, yard, weight 
room, billiards table and library), cert. granted, Ill S. Ct. 41 (1990) (No. 89-7376); French v. 
Owens, 777 F.2d 1250, 1253 (7th Cir. 1985) (practice of double ceiling not per se unconstitutional), 
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 817 (1986); Cody v. Hillard, 830 F.2d 912, 916 (8th Cir. 1987) (en bane) 
(double ceiling did not violate constitution), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 906 (1988); cf. Akao v. Shimoda, 
832 F.2d 119, 120 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (while overcrowding in and of itself not constitu-
tional violation, eighth amendment violated when overcrowding "engenders violence, tension, and 
psychiatric problems"), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 993 (1988). 
2945. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); see Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) 
("it is obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith, that characterize the 
conduct" prohibited by eighth amendment). 
2946. Compare Miranda v. Munoz, 770 F.2d 255, 259 (1st Cir. 1985) (sufficient evidence for jury 
to find failure to transfer epileptic prisoner to hospital was deliberate indifference and constituted 
eighth amendment violation); Hathaway v. Coughlin, 841 F.2d 48, 50-51 (2d Cir. 1988) (allegation 
that prison officials took two years to arrange prisoner's surgery for broken hip pins sufficient to 
state claim of deliberate indifference to prisoner's medical needs); White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 
110-11 (3d Cir. 1990) (allegation that prison physician refused to prescribe medication previously 
prescribed by inmate's physician under express "no substitution" order sufficient to state claim of 
deliberate indifference); Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 852-53 (4th Cir. 1990) (evidence sufficient 
to support inference of deliberate indifference where three doctors failed to act on inmate's com-
plaints of chest pain, blackouts, and shortness of breath, and inmate later died of heart attack); 
Jackson v. Cain, 864 F.2d 1235, 1247 (5th Cir. 1989) (eighth amendment claim sufficiently stated 
when material issue existed as to whether prison officials knowingly assigned inmate to work detail 
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quate medical facilities2947 may rise to the level of "deliberate indifference" to 
a prisoner's medical needs. In addition, failure to protect a prisoner from 
fellow inmates may constitute cruel and unusual punishment. 2948 
that would aggravate serious medical condition); Kelly v. McGinnis, 899 F.2d 612, 617 (7th Cir. 
1990) (allegations that prisoner's requests to see doctor concerning foot problems repeatedly denied 
and ineffective treatment given for three years sufficient to state claim of deliberate indifference); 
Johnson v. Bowers, 884 F.2d 1053, 1056 (8th Cir. 1989) (nine-year delay since original recommen-
dation of surgery on forearm injured in prison evidence of deliberate indifference); Ortiz v. City of 
Imperial, 884 F.2d 1312, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989) (survivors of prisoner stated claim of deliberate indif-
ference where doctors and nurses knew of prisoner's head injury, but disregarded evidence of com-
plications and prescribed sedatives when inadvisable) and Mandel v. Doe, 888 F.2d 783, 789-90 
(11th Cir. 1989) (eighth amendment violation when guard saw prisoner collapse, and physician's 
assistant observed pain and dragging of leg, ignored repeated indications of worsening condition, 
and refused to conduct x-ray, necessitating replacement of hip joint) with Mikeska v. Collins, 900 
F.2d 833, 837 (5th Cir. 1990) (no eighth amendment violation when prisoner with stomach ulcer 
assigned to work detail which may have aggravated condition because prison officials did not know-
ingly assign prisoner to detail they knew would worsen condition); Taylor v. Turner, 884 F.2d 1088, 
1090 (8th Cir. 1989) (no deliberate indifference when prisoner injured by another inmate examined 
by six physicians, received surgery for correction of vision, and underwent psychological and educa-
tional testing); Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990) (failure of prison officials 
to provide prisoner's medical records to transferee prison, causing confiscation of prisoner's sling, 
further injury, and delay in treatment did not rise to level of deliberate indifference) and Supre v. 
Ricketts, 792 F.2d 958, 963 (lOth Cir. 1986) (medical decision not to administer estrogen to 
transsexual inmate, because of controversial nature of treatment and disagreement among medical 
staff, not deliberate indifference to inmate's serious medical needs). 
2947. Compare LaFaut v. Smith, 834 F.2d 389, 392-94 (4th Cir. 1987) (prison officials' failure to 
provide inmate with handicap bar near toilet in paraplegic prisoner's cell or in carpentry shop 
where prisoner worked, with adequate therapy after contracting kidney infection and suffering bro-
ken leg, and with adequate rehabilitation therapy constituted deliberate indifference to serious medi-
cal needs) with Jackson v. Fair, 846 F.2d 811, 817-18 (1st Cir. 1988) (no claim of deliberate 
indifference to serious medical needs when prisoner transferred from high security psychiatric hos-
pital to general prison population of another institution, because treatment at new facility was ade-
quate and prisoner does not have right to treatment of choice); Donald v. Wilson, 847 F.2d 1191, 
1194 (6th Cir. 1988) (no claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs when prisoner's 
prosthesis temporarily confiscated because prosthesis not medically necessary, prisoner given 
crutches, and prisoner had used prosthesis at another prison to carry contraband and as weapon) 
and Murphy v. Lane, 833 F.2d 106, 107-08 (7th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (no claim of deliberate 
indifference to serious medical needs when suicidal prisoner received adequate psychiatric treat-
ment, had prompt medical attention following suicide attempt, placed in "crisis care watch" upon 
arrival, and placed in segregation pending transfer to facility more properly staffed to care for his 
psychiatric needs). 
2948. Compare Cortes-Quinones v. Jimenez-Nettleship, 842 F.2d 556, 558-61 (1st Cir.) (place-
ment of psychologically disturbed prisoner into general population where conditions chaotic and 
prison under federal court decree requiring segregation of severely mentally ill prisoners constituted 
deliberate indifference to inmates' health and safety when prisoner subsequently killed and dismem-
bered), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 823 (1988); Morales v. New York State Dep't of Corrections, 842 F.2d 
27, 29-30 (2d Cir. 1988) (prisoner who had been attacked and seriously injured by other inmate 
after prisoner had obtained order sequestering inmate stated claim of deliberate indifference); Frett 
v. Virgin Islands, 839 F.2d 968, 978-79 (3d Cir. 1988) (guard's failure to ensure that inmate placed 
in lockdown following assault on prisoner, which enabled inmate to return within lO minutes and 
attack prisoner again, stabbing him five times, constituted reckless disregard for prisoner's rights 
when attacking inmate known to be dangerous and involved in numerous previous attacks on 
guards and inmates); Pressley v. Hutto, 816 F.2d 977, 979 (4th Cir. 1987) (allegations that officials 
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The use of force by prison officials may constitute cruel and unusual pun-
ishment. Force amounting to the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain 
is unconstitutional. 2949 In the context of quelling prison disturbances, how-
ignored prisoner's request to be separated from cellmates following previous altercation and that he 
subsequently was assaulted by cellmates stated claim for deliberate indifference to specific known 
risk of harm); Alberti v. K.Jevenhagen, 790 F.2d 1220, 1226 (5th Cir. 1986) (level of violence and 
sexual assault constituted cruel and unusual punishment when over 1200 acts of violence were 
reported every year in institution with total capacity of 4000 inmates, and evidence indicated re-
ported violence might have been only "tip of the iceberg"); Santiago v. Lane, 894 F.2d 218, 222-23 
(7th Cir. 1990) (allegation that prison officials failed to sufficiently notify transferee prison of in-
mate's special security needs sufficient to state claim of deliberate indifference to known risk); 
Thomas v. Booker, 784 F.2d 299, 306 (8th Cir.) (eighth amendment violated when prison guard 
knew of fight between inmates and did not intercede to prevent it), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1117 
(1986) and Morgan v. District of Columbia, 824 F.2d 1049, 1058-61 (D.C. Cir 1987) (allegations 
that prison officials knew inmate, a convicted murderer with history of psychological problems and 
physical violence, posed serious danger to fellow prisoners and yet allowed him to remain in open 
population, even after uncovering his plan to kill another inmate, resulting in inmate's attacking 
and injuring another prisoner, sufficient to state claim of deliberate indifference) with Ruefly v. 
Landon, 825 F.2d 792, 794 (4th Cir. 1987) (no eighth amendment violation when prison officials 
failed to protect prisoner from assault, resulting in broken cheekbone and loss of eye, because com-
plaint did not sufficiently allege deliberate indifference to specific known risk of harm); Johnston v. 
Lucas, 786 F.2d 1254, 1260 (5th Cir. 1986) (no eighth amendment violation when prison officials, 
without conscious indifference, allowed prisoner to be jailed in same unit with inmate with known 
animosity to prisoner, which resulted in stabbing incident); Jones v. Hamelman, 869 F.2d 1023, 
1024-26 (7th Cir. 1989) (case properly dismissed when inmate claimed he had requested not to be 
released from his cell, was released, and was assaulted by inmate with ice pick, because inmate 
could not prove request, officials denied oral or written notice, and magistrate found that security 
procedures were reasonably adequate); Bailey v. Wood, 909 F.2d 1197, 1200 (8th Cir. 1990) (war-
den not deliberately indifferent to inmate's safety when he transferred threatening inmate to com-
plex at other end of prison, but failed to anticipate guard would leave post resulting in stabbing); 
Blankenship v. Meachum, 840 F.2d 741, 742-43 (lOth Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (no constitutional 
violation when protective custody prisoner transferred to another facility, placed in general popula-
tion, and subsequently attacked by inmate, because prisoner alleged no more than inadvertence or 
good faith error and did not allege that prison officials acted in wanton or obdurate manner) and 
Brown v. Hughes, 894 F.2d 1533, 1537 (11th Cir.) (per curiam) (no eighth amendment violation 
when inmate, who indicated "racial problem" in cell, returned to cell voluntarily and was later 
attacked), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2624 ( 1990). 
2949. Ingraham v. Wight, 430 U.S. 651, 670 (1977) ("After incarceration, only the 'unnecessary 
and wanton infliction of pain' constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth 
Amendment"); compare Miller v. Leathers, 913 F.2d 1085, 1088-89 (4th Cir. 1989) (en bane) (in-
mate stated sufficient claim of excessive force to escape summary judgment where guard removed 
prisoner from cell outside supervision of higher authority and struck him three times on arms and 
wrists after prisoner refused to proceed through obstructed cellblock exit and provoked guard with 
racial taunts and sexual insults about guard's mother); Johnston v. Lucas, 786 F.2d 1254, 1257 (5th 
Cir. 1986) (excessive force used by prison guards to remove prisoner from cell violated prisoner's 
civil rights); Franklin v. Aycock, 795 F.2d 1253, 1258-59 (6th Cir. 1986) (beating and shackling 
prisoner to bed during disturbance in administrative segregation unit violated eighth amendment); 
Campbell v. Grammer, 889 F.2d 797, 802 (8th Cir. 1989) (inmates' eighth amendment rights vio-
lated when guards intentionally sprayed them with high-powered fire hose while extinguishing fires 
started by inmates) and Gaut v. Sunn, 810 F.2d 923, 924-25 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (prisoner's 
allegations that he was severely beaten, kicked, choked, and thrown against wall by several guards 
during prison shakedown and beaten again while handcuffed in holding unit, stated claim of depri-
vation of constitutional rights) with Henry v. Perry, 866 F.2d 657, 659 (3d Cir. 1989) (guard who 
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ever, prison officials may use the force they believe in good faith to be neces-
sary to maintain or restore control of the prison, provided that it is not 
applied maliciously or sadistically for the purpose of causing harm.295° Fac-
tors to be considered in determining whether force was applied in good faith 
include the need for the application of force, the relationship between the 
need and the amount of force used and the extent of the injury inflicted, as 
well as the extent of the threat to the safety of the prison staff and the other 
inmates, as reasonably perceived by the responsible official. 2951 The use of 
force does not amount to cruel and unusual punishment simply because it 
appears, in retrospect, that the degree of force authorized or applied was 
unreasonable or unnecessary.2952 The judgment of prison officials as to the 
policies and actions needed to preserve or restore a prison's internal order is 
given wide-ranging deference by courts.2953 
Retained Rights to Procedural Due Process. The fifth and fourteenth 
amendments prohibit the government from depriving persons of life, liberty 
or property without due process of law.2954 The threshold question in any 
due process case is whether a protected liberty or property interest is in-
volved. 2955 Liberty interests can be created by the Constitution, 2956 a court 
used deadly force to halt escape of prisoner convicted of crime involving serious bodily harm, did 
not violate prisoner's eighth amendment rights); Huguet v. Barnett, 900 F.2d 838, 840-41 (5th Cir. 
1990) (no claim of excessive force where leg irons applied to recalcitrant prisoner; prisoner must 
prove significant injury, resulting directly from use of force clearly excessive to need, objectively 
unreasonable, and constituting unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain) and Michenfelder v. 
Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 336 (9th Cir. 1988) (use of "taser gun" to force compliance with orders does 
not constitute cruel and unusual punishment). A prisoner must proffer evidence of significant inju-
ries to establish a claim of excessive force. See Wise v. Carlson, 902 F.2d 417, 417-18 (5th Cir. 
1990) (per curiam) (prisoner who suffered only superficial injuries failed to ~tate claim of unlawful 
use of excessive force by guards); Bennett v. Parker, 898 F.2d 1530, 1533-34 (11th Cir. 1990) (alle-
gation that officers pushed inmate against bars and struck him with nightstick on side of head failed 
to state claim of excessive force absent physical evidence or medical records indicating severe inju-
ries), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1003 (1991). 
2950. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986) (no constitutional violation when prisoner 
shot in leg while in apparent pursuit of correctional officer during quelling of prison riot). 
2951. /d. 
2952. /d. at 319. 
2953. /d. at 321-22; see Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 n.14 (1981) ("prison's internal 
security is peculiarly a matter normally left to the discretion of prison administrators"). 
2954. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. The due process clauses are designed to protect the individ-
ual against arbitrary government action. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974) (citing 
Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 123 (1889)). 
2955. Kentucky Dept. of Corrections v. Thompson, 109 S. Ct. 1904, 1908 (1989); Meachum v. 
Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-24 (1976). The due process clause is an independent basis for protection of 
a liberty or property interest only if the "conditions or degree of confinement" are not within the 
sentence imposed upon the inmate. Thompson, 109 S. Ct. at 1908-09. 
2956. Compare Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1036 (1990) (liberty interest in avoiding 
unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs); Kentucky Dept. of Corrections v. Thompson, 109 
S. Ct. 1904, 1911 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (suggesting due process implication in prison 
1991] CRIMINAL PROCEDURE PROJECT 1269 
order,2957 a statute,2958 a regulation,2959 or a standard practice, policy, or 
regulation completely prohibiting visitation); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493-94 (1980) (liberty 
interest in not being transferred to mental hospital); Domegan v. Fair, 859 F.2d 1059, 1063 (lst Cir. 
1988) (liberty interest implicated when conditions imposed in non-emergency situations outside 
bounds of sentence, even though temporary in nature); Chambers v. Ingram, 858 F.2d 351, 359-60 
(7th Cir. 1988) (liberty interest in ability to refuse ingestion of psychotropic drugs; however, interest 
may give way in medical emergency) and Burton v. Livingston, 791 F.2d 97, 100 (8th Cir. 1986) 
(liberty interest in freedom from terror of instant and unexpected death) with Kentucky Dept. of 
Corrections v. Thompson, 109 S. Ct. 1904, 1910-1911 & n.4 (1989) (no liberty interest in prisoner's 
access to particular visitor); Montayne v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242-43 (1976) (no liberty interest 
in freedom from intrastate transfer to different facility); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-27 
(1976) (same); Matiyn v. Henderson, 841 F.2d 31, 34 (2d Cir.) (no liberty interest in freedom from 
transfer to another prison), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1220 (1988); James v. Quinlan, 866 F.2d 627, 630 
(3d Cir.) (no liberty interest in job assignment), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 197 (1989); Moody v. Baker, 
857 F.2d 256, 257-58 (5th Cir.) (no liberty or property interest in classification as disabled), cert. 
denied, 488 U.S. 985 (1988); Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 414 (7th Cir.) (no liberty 
interest in freedom from prolonged confinement in administrative segregation), cert. denied, 484 
U.S. 935 (1987) and Tyler v. Black, 811 F.2d 424, 427 (8th Cir. 1987) (no liberty interest in remain-
ing in general prison population), vacated in part, 865 F.2d 181 (8th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 
490 u.s. 1027 (1989). 
2957. See Chitwood v. Dowd, 889 F.2d 781, 786 (8th Cir. 1989) (trial court discretion to sen-
tence defendant created liberty interest in expectation that liberty lost only to extent determined by 
court), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2219 (1990). 
2958. Compare Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 372-80 (1987) (statute mandating that 
parole board release prisoner, subject to certain restrictions, created liberty interest in parole re-
lease); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 487-90 (1980) (statute specifying preconditions for prison trans-
fer to mental institution created liberty interest in freedom from transfer); Greenholtz v. Inmates of 
Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7-11 (1979) (statute requiring parole in absence of 
findings in accordance with designated criteria created liberty interest in parole); Domegan v. Fair, 
859 F.2d 1059, 1064 (1st Cir. 1988) (statute creating absolute right to full and regular meals, light, 
ventilation, and sanitation facilities created liberty interest); Bonner v. Lewis, 857 F.2d 559, 561-65 
(9th Cir. 1988) (statute granting deaf mute sensory aids created liberty interest, but no liberty inter-
est in "qualified interpreters") and Barfield v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923, 935-37 (11th Cir. 1989) (stat-
utes establishing segregated detention facilities for youthful offenders created liberty interest) with 
Dixon v. Fox, 893 F.2d 1556, 1557 (8th Cir.) (no liberty interest in special diet created by statute 
prohibiting food restriction from being used as disciplinary measure), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 262 
(1990); cf. Gillihan v. Shillinger, 872 F.2d 935, 938-39 (lOth Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (statute guar-
anteeing return of unused money created property interest in funds); Moss v. Clark, 886 F.2d 686, 
692 (4th Cir. 1989) (no liberty interest created by statute providing good time credit at selected 
facilities because assignment to facility discretionary). 
2959. Compare Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 471-72 (1983) (state regulation promulgating 
mandatory procedures for administrative segregation created liberty interest in freedom from ad-
ministrative detention); Lanier v. Fair, 876 F.2d 243, 248 (1st Cir. 1989) (halfway house operation 
manual created liberty interest in remaining at house); Russell v. Coughlin, 910 F.2d 75, 77 (2d Cir. 
1990) (regulation mandating disciplinary hearing within seven days of confinement created liberty 
interest); Todaro v. Boomer, 872 F.2d 43, 48 (3d Cir. 1989) (regulation limiting confinement to 24 
hours created liberty interest in freedom from confinement for longer period); Dzana v. Foti, 829 
F.2d 558, 560-61 (5th Cir. 1987) (regulation mandating sanctions only for certain offenses created 
liberty interest in remaining free from disciplinary segregation unless offense committed); Edwards 
v. Lockhart, 908 F.2d 299, 301-03 (8th Cir. 1990) (regulation governing work release program 
outside correctional facility like parole and thus created liberty interest) and McQueen v. Tabah, 
839 F.2d 1525, 1528 (11th Cir. 1988) (regulations governing administrative segregation created 
liberty interest in remaining in general prison population) with Kentucky Dept. of Corrections v. 
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custom. 2960 
Whether a liberty interest is created will often depend on the amount of 
discretion afforded prison officials by a statute or regulation. In order to 
create a liberty interest, the statute or regulation must establish "substantive 
predicates" for the official's decision and must employ mandatory language 
governing the outcome.2961 When either of these elements are missing, no 
liberty interest is created. 2962 The presence of procedural guidelines applica-
Thompson, 109 S. Ct. 1904, 1910-11 (1989) (regulation containing "substantive predicates" guiding 
exclusion of visitors from prison but lacking mandatory language did not create liberty interest in 
admittance of particular visitor); Stephany v. Wagner, 835 F.2d 497, 501-02 (3d Cir. 1987) (regula-
tions specifying four occasions for administrative segregation but lacking mandatory language did 
not create liberty interest in freedom from administrative segregation), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1207 
(1988); Colon v. Schneider, 899 F.2d 660, 668-69 (7th Cir. 1990) (regulations prioritizing other 
actions over use of mace did not create liberty interest because mace use discretionary) and 
Muhammad v. Carlson, 845 F.2d 175, 178 (8th Cir. 1988) (no liberty interest in freedom from 
transfer to AIDS unit when no substantive limits placed on official discretion once medical evalua-
tion made), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1068 (1989); cf. Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1092 (9th 
Cir. 1986) (repeal of state regulation controlling administrative segregation destroyed liberty inter-
est in remaining in general population), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1069 (1987). 
2960. Compare Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1033-34, 1036 (1990) (state correction 
center policy of involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs only where inmate suffers from 
"mental disorder" that renders inmate "gravely disabled" or likely to cause "serious harm" and 
only with procedural protections including independent medical review and adversarial hearing 
created liberty interest); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 489-90 (1980) (practice of transferring only 
prisoners suffering from mental disease or disorder to mental hospital created liberty interest in 
remaining free from transfer); Clark v. Brewer, 776 F.2d 226, 230-31 (8th Cir. 1985) (policy requir-
ing periodic status review of inmates placed in "close management" created liberty interest) and 
Bergen v. Spaulding, 881 F.2d 719, 722 (9th Cir. 1989) (recommendation of superintendent in re-
gard to parole date created liberty interest in date) with Kentucky Dept. of Corrections v. Thomp-
son, 109 S. Ct. 1904, 1910-11 (1989) (procedures memorandum indicating policy to respect inmate 
visitation rights did not create interest in visitation with particular visitors because mandatory lan-
guage lacking); Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 466-67 (1981) (state's past 
practice of commuting life sentences did not create protected liberty interest in commutation be-
cause pardons board given "unfettered discretion") and Burgin v. Nix, 899 F.2d 733, 734-35 (8th 
Cir. 1990) (policy specifying "sack" meals for incorrigible inmates did not create liberty interest in 
specific type of meal because prison officials maintained discretion over meals served). 
2961. Kentucky Dept. of Corrections v. Thompson, 109 S. Ct. 1904, 1909-10 (1989); see Bd. of 
Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 377-80 (1987) (although parole release decision "necessarily subjec-
tive and predictive," statute stating Board "shall release" prisoner when substantive predicates met 
created liberty interest); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 471-72 (1983) (statute governing adminis-
trative segregation that established factual predicates for segregation and mandated certain proce-
dures created liberty interest); Lanier v. Fair, 876 F.2d 243, 252-53 (1st Cir. 1989) (language in 
regulation limiting rescission of assigned reserve parole date created liberty interest in date); Franco 
v. Moreland, 805 F.2d 798, 800 (8th Cir. 1986) (county directive establishing substantive prerequi-
sites before inmate could be placed in administrative segregation and defining length and condition 
of segregation created liberty interest); Bergen v. Spaulding, 881 F.2d 719, 721-22 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(state law giving superintendent control over entitlement to good time credits and Parole Board 
power over revocation created liberty interest in parole date); McQueen v. Tabah, 839 F.2d 1525, 
1528 (lith Cir. 1988) (rules and regulations that contained mandatory language and substantive 
predicates governing administrative segregation created liberty interest). 
2962. Thompson, 109 S. Ct. at 1910-11 (visitation regulations providing substantive predicates 
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ble to a decision is insufficient by itself to create a liberty interest. 2963 
Once an interest is classified as protected, a court must balance "the pri-
vate interests at stake in a governmental decision, the governmental interests 
involved, and the value of procedural requirements in determining what pro-
cess is due under the fourteenth amendment. " 2964 The nature of the proce-
dural safeguards required depends on the relative weights accorded the 
private and governmental interests. 2965 Thus, the Supreme Court has held 
for exclusion of visitors, but Jacking mandatory language compelling admittance or exclusion did 
not create liberty interest); see Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983) (prisoner transfer 
regulation did not create liberty interest when no standards governed decision and prison adminis-
trator free to accept or reject committee's recommendation); Jackson v. Fair, 846 F.2d 811, 816 (1st 
Cir. 1988) (no liberty interest in remaining in prison mental hospital because statute did not limit 
prison officials' discretion to discharge); Gill v. Mooney, 824 F.2d 192, 194 (2d Cir. 1987) (statute 
stating officials "may" provide jobs for prisoners did not create liberty interest); Stephany v. Wag-
ner, 835 F.2d 497, 501-02 (3d Cir. 1987) (regulations specifying four occasions for administrative 
segregation but Jacking mandatory language did not create liberty interest in freedom from adminis-
trative segregation), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1207 (1988); Paoli v. Lally, 812 F.2d 1489, 1492-93 (4th 
Cir.) (statutes and regulations lacking mandatory language did not create liberty interest in remain-
ing in minimum security facility), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 864 (1987); Scales v. Mississippi State 
Parole Bd., 831 F.2d 565, 566 (5th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (no liberty interest in parole because 
statute conferred absolute discretion on parole board); Canterino v. Wilson, 869 F.2d 948, 953 (6th 
Cir. 1989) (no right to work release, study release, or particular classification when officials given 
great discretion); Russ v. Young, 895 F.2d 1149, 1153 (7th Cir. 1990) (no liberty interest in remain-
ing free from temporary lockup because regulation contained discretionary rather than mandatory 
language); Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1207 (8th Cir. 1990) (no liberty interest in improv-
ing inmate job class status where prison officials' discretion for classification not limited); Francis v. 
Fox, 838 F.2d 1147, 1149-50 (11th Cir. 1988) (no liberty interest in work release because statute 
framed in discretionary terms). 
2963. Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 471; 0/im, 461 U.S. at 250. 
2964. Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1041 (1990) (quoting Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 473); 
Jackson v. Cain, 864 F.2d 1235, 1251-52 (5th Cir. 1989) (prison's failure to follow own procedures 
not due process violation when action comports with constitutional minimums); Brown v. Frey, 889 
F.2d 159, 166 & n.12 (8th Cir. 1989) (prison's failure to comply with statute requiring hearing 
within 72 hours of confinement not due process violation if hearing within reasonable time of segre-
gation), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1156 (1990). 
2965. Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 473 (1983); compare Lanier v. Fair, 876 F.2d 243, 248-50 (1st Cir. 
1989) (due process not violated when former halfway house resident afforded notice of charges, 
received post-transfer hearing justified by violent history, and notified of reasons why reserve parole 
date rescinded); Bolden v. Alston, 810 F.2d 353, 357 (2d Cir.) (due process not violated when 
administrative detainee, confined for five days pending disciplinary hearing, received less procedural 
protection than detainee in disciplinary confinement), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 896 (1987); Moody v. 
Miller, 864 F.2d 1178, 1179-81 (5th Cir. 1989) (due process not violated when inmate unable to 
attend hearing due to hospitalization); McCollum v. Williford, 793 F.2d 903, 908 (7th Cir. 1986) 
(due process not violated when cross-examination denied in maximum security prison disciplinary 
hearing, because witness found reliable, statement under oath, and witness' safety at stake); Malek 
v. Camp, 822 F.2d 812, 815 (8th Cir. 1987) (due process not violated during disciplinary hearing 
when calling of 13 witnesses denied, because prisoner's testimony and written statement of one 
witness sufficiently protected prisoner's interest); Bonner v. Lewis, 857 F.2d 559, 562-64 (9th Cir. 
1988) (due process not violated when deaf mute with fourth grade reading level deprived of inter-
preter in order to communicate with disciplinary committee); Ort v. White, 813 F.2d 318, 326-27 
(11th Cir. 1987) (due process not violated when inmate "punished" without hearing when guard 
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that the decision to administer antipsychotic drugs to a prisoner without his 
consent need not be made by a judge.2966 It has also held that an inmate's 
liberty interest in freedom from administrative detention2967 can be ade-
quately protected by a nonadversarial review of the evidence as long as the 
prisoner receives some notice and an opportunity to present her views.2968 If 
denied water to him outside prison walls after spontaneous disruption, because immediate action 
necessary to maintain discipline) and Crosby-Bey v. District of Columbia, 786 F.2d 1182, 1185 
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (due process not violated when inmate moved from administrative to disciplinary 
segregation because minimal loss of liberty interest not enough to require full panoply of due pro-
cess protections) with Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1115-16 (3d Cir. 1989) (due process vio-
lated because interest in avoiding wrongful detention outweighed administrative burden of having 
person hear inmate's claim that held beyond sentence). 
2966. Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1042. The decision to administer the drugs was made by a panel of 
medical experts after the prisoner received notice, an opportunity to be present at an adversary 
hearing, and an opportunity to present and cross-examine witnesses. /d.; see Chambers v. Ingram, 
858 F.2d 351, 353, 359-60 (7th Cir. 1988) (inmate involuntarily placed in psychiatric ward and 
determined to have suicidal tendencies had liberty interest in ability to refuse psychotropic drugs, 
but interest yielded without procedural protections in medical emergency). 
2967. Administrative segregation is used to protect a prisoner's safety, to break up groups of 
potentially disruptive inmates, or to confine a prisoner awaiting reclassification. Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 
468 (1983) (distinguishing between administrative and disciplinary segregation); cf Todaro v. Bow-
man, 872 F.2d 43, 47-49 (3d Cir. 1989) (administrative segregation that is extensive and imposed as 
punishment, or becomes punishment because of lack of privileges, can result in due process viola-
tion if punishment procedures not followed); Abdul-Wadood v. Duckworth, 860 F.2d 280, 285 (7th 
Cir. 1988) (confinement labelled administrative segregation can be disciplinary if restriction on in-
mate not same as on other inmates during emergency lockdown). 
2968. Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 476. In Hewitt, an inmate was placed in administrative segregation 
pending completion of an investigation of his role in a prison riot. /d. at 463-64. The Court found 
the prisoner's liberty interest in remaining in the general prison population, which arose from state 
statutes and regulations, was sufficiently protected by his receipt of notice of the charges and an 
opportunity to present a statement. /d. at 470-72. It also concluded that any more elaborate proce-
dures would not have assisted the determination of whether to place the individual in administrative 
segregation, because the decision was based largely on subjective criteria. /d. at 474; see Abdul-
Wadood v. Duckworth, 860 F.2d 280, 283-84 (7th Cir. 1988) (inmate placed in detention as part of 
unit lockdown entitled to notice and opportunity to express view at classification hearing but no 
right to have lay advocate); Rust v. Grammer, 858 F.2d 411, 412-13 (8th Cir. 1988) (non-punitive 
administrative lockdown without formal charge or hearing did not violate due process despite re-
strictions on clothing, bedding, visitation, laundry, recreation, and meals). The Hewitt Court estab-
lished some requirements for the proceedings: the decisionmaker must review the charges and the 
available evidence against the prisoner, 459 U.S. at 474, and the proceedings must take place within 
a reasonable time after an inmate's transfer. /d. at 476 n.8. Reasonableness turns on the relatively 
insubstantial private interests at stake and the traditionally broad discretion of prison officials. /d.; 
see Russell v. Coughlin, 910 F.2d 75, 78 (2d Cir. 1990) (10-day confinement of inmate without 
providing notice of charge or hearing violates "reasonable time" standard of Hewitt); Abernathy v. 
Perry, 869 F.2d 1146, 1147-48 (8th Cir. 1989) (placement of inmate in administrative segregation 
for 35 days without notice of charge violated due process); Bostic v. Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267, 1270, 
1274 (9th Cir. 1989) (no due process violation where inmate had disciplinary hearing postponed 
twice because hearing held within reasonable time after administrative segregation). In addition, 
prison officials must engage in periodic review of the inmates transferred to administrative segrega-
tion. Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 477 n.9; see Sourbeer v. Robinson, 791 F.2d 1094, 1101 (3d Cir. 1986) 
(purported justifications for continuing prison inmate's administrative confinement examined in 
perfunctory manner at monthly reviews denied inmate due process), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1032 
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the governmental decision involves the involuntary transfer of a prisoner 
from a prison to a mental hospital, however, due process requires greater 
procedural safeguards, including an adversarial hearing.2969 
Due process questions frequently arise when a prisoner is subject to disci-
plinary action. In Wol.ff v. McDonnell, 2970 the Supreme Court held that cer-
tain minimum procedural safeguards must be provided if a disciplinary 
hearing could deprive a prisoner of good time credits or result in disciplinary 
segregation.2971 The procedural requirements include at least 24 hour ad-
vance written notice of the claimed violation, an opportunity to be heard, the 
opportunity to call witnesses unless doing so would jeopardize prison secur-
ity, and a written statement detailing evidence relied on and reasons for the 
disciplinary action. 2972 Due process requires that "some evidence" support 
the disciplinary board's decision.297J 
(1987); Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1101 (9th Cir. 1986) (annual review of prisoner's 
status in administrative segregation did not adequately protect prisoner's liberty interest), cert. de-
nied, 481 U.S. 1069 (1987). 
2969. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494-96 (1980). The prisoner in Vitek was transferred to a 
mental hospital after the prison psychiatrist determined the prisoner was suffering from a mental 
illness. /d. at 484. The Court found that the liberty interest in freedom from transfer to a mental 
hospital, created by statute and prison practice, required the procedural safeguards of notice and an 
adversary hearing. /d. at 489-90, 494-96. Although the state has a strong interest in segregating 
and treating mentally ill patients, the Court concluded that the prisoner's interest "in not being 
arbitrarily classified as mentally ill and subjected to unwelcome treatment," when combined with 
the risk of error in the transfer determination, is "substantial enough to warrant the increased 
procedural safeguards." /d. at 495. 
2970. 418 u.s. 539 (1974). 
2971. /d. at 557-58; see Bergen v. Spaulding, 881 F.2d 719, 721-22 (9th Cir. 1989) (inmate de-
prived of full benefit from accumulated good time credits entitled to procedural due process 
protections). 
2972. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-67; compare Smith v. Maschner, 899 F.2d 940, 946 (lOth Cir. 1990) 
(no due process violation where prisoner provided with written transcript containing evidence sup-
porting disciplinary action in lieu of written statement of evidence) with Gittens v. LeFevre, 891 
F.2d 38, 40-41 (2d Cir. 1989) (administrative segregation regulations not allowing confined inmate 
opportunity to make statement until adjudication of disciplinary charge violated procedural due 
process). 
The due process right to an opportunity to be heard does not include an absolute right to be 
present at the hearing. Moody v. Miller, 864 F.2d 1178, 1180-81 (5th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) 
(presence of counsel for inmate not required in absence of inmate). There is no requirement that 
prison officials reschedule a hearing when they know the inmate is in the hospital. /d. They also 
need not assure that an inmate will avail herself of her rights. /d. 
An inmate's due process rights are violated if she is punished for conduct that is not proscribed 
by rules or policy. Coffman v. Trickey, 884 F.2d 1057, 1060 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 
1523 (1990). In Coffman, an inmate was sentenced to administrative detention for waving at a 
visitor through a security fence. /d. at 1058. The inmate was charged with "(k]nowingly failing to 
abide by any published institutional rule," but the charge did not specify which rule was violated. 
/d. at 1058 & n.l. The court held that the inmate had been deprived of liberty without due process. 
/d. at 1059-60. 
2973. Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985). The Court reasoned that the standard 
would "help to prevent arbitrary deprivations without threatening institutional interests or impos-
ing undue administrative burdens." /d. The "some evidence" standard was satisfied by eyewitness 
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Although prison officials must provide an explanation if they refuse to al-
low an inmate to call a witness at a disciplinary hearing, they may do so on 
the record during the hearing or in court if the denial is subsequently chal-
lenged.2974 The reasons for denying permission to present witnesses must be 
logically related to institutional safety or correctional goals. 2975 Due process 
does not require prison officials to reveal an informant's identity to an in-
mate.2976 Nevertheless, the informant's testimony must show sufficient indi-
cia of reliability.2977 
testimony of a prison guard who testified he saw the defendants fleeing from an area where an 
inmate had just been assaulted. /d. at 456-57; see Peranzo v. Coughlin, 850 F.2d 125, 126 (2d Cir. 
1988) (per curiam) (drug test that was 98% accurate sufficient evidence to warrant prison disci-
pline); Baker v. Lyles, 904 F.2d 925, 932-33 (4th Cir. 1990) (hearsay statement that inmate in 
possession of escape tools combined with knowledge of inmate's prior escape sufficient evidence); 
Viens v. Daniels, 871 F.2d 1328, 1335-36 (7th Cir. 1989) (testimony of informant verified by poly-
graph test sufficient evidence, despite physician's testimony questioning reliability and unpresented 
evidence in conflict with informant); Rudd v. Sargent, 866 F.2d 260, 262 (8th Cir. 1989) (per 
curiam) (report of official who did not witness incident, which included charges and evidence, suffi-
cient evidence to support committee's conclusion, even though report would be inadmissable hear-
say if trial); Zimmerlee v. Keeney, 831 F.2d 183, 186-87 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (unidentified 
informant's testimony sufficient evidence to satisfy due process when informant witnessed drug 
smuggling, previously supplied reliable information, passed polygraph examination, and testimony 
corroborated by disciplined inmate's testimony), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1207 (1988); cf. Brown v. 
Smith, 828 F.2d 1493, 1495 (lOth Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (unverified statements elicited from confi-
dential informant and two misread polygraph tests did not constitute "any" evidence to find inmate 
guilty of assault). 
2974. Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. 491, 497 (1985). The Court reasoned that the additional adminis-
trative burden created by requiring contemporaneous reasons would "detract from the ability to 
perform the principal mission of the institution." /d. at 498. 
2975. /d. at 497; compare Brooks v. Andolina, 826 F.2d 1266, 1269 (3d Cir. 1987) (prison offi-
cials' refusal to permit inmate to call witnesses at disciplinary hearing violated due process when 
officials made no showing of hazard to safety or correctional goals) with Malek v. Camp, 822 F.2d 
812, 815 (8th Cir. 1987) (officials could deny inmate's request to call 13 witnesses when written 
statement of one witness taken because allowing inmates to call witnesses "as a matter of course" 
would make disciplinary proceedings unmanageable) and Bostic v. Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267, 1271, 
1273 (9th Cir. 1989) (number of witnesses may be limited if additional testimony would be 
repetitive). 
2976. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 567-69 (decision whether to allow inmate to confront and cross-
examine inmate accusers left to "sound discretion" of prison officials). The Court noted that the 
possibility of prison disruption may be greatest when an accused is allowed to examine an informant 
because it creates a risk of reprisal. /d. at 568-69; cf. Wells v. Israel, 854 F.2d 995, 999 (7th Cir. 
1988) (officials must consider inmate informant's safety when making decision relating to testimony 
or identity). 
2977. Wells v. Israel, 854 F.2d 995, 998-99 (7th Cir. 1988) (disciplinary committee must ascer-
tain reliability of inmate informer to assure "full and meaningful hearing" without jeopardizing 
prison security or informant safety; inmate not entitled to any minimum process in challenging 
reliability of confidential information); see Freitas v. Auger, 837 F.2d 806, 810-11 (8th Cir. 1988) 
(statements of two informants at disciplinary hearing had sufficient indicia of reliability when con-
sistent with each other, contained some factual background, and against informants' penal interest); 
Zimmerlee v. Keeney, 831 F.2d 183, 187 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (testimony of unidentified 
inmate informant who was eyewitness to drug smuggling reliable enough to satisfy due process at 
disciplinary hearing when informant previously supplied reliable information and passed polygraph 
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If a disciplinary hearing could result in parole revocation, courts require 
greater procedural protections. 2978 In addition to the minimal protections 
outlined in Wolff, parole revocation proceedings must provide a prisoner the 
opportunity to cross-examine witnesses2979 and, under some circumstances, 
to receive the assistance of counsel. 2980 
The due process clause may also be implicated when a prisoner suffers 
personal injury or a loss of property. Merely negligent conduct by officials 
toward prisoners or their property cannot give rise to a procedural due pro-
cess claim even when no remedy exists under state law;2981 instead, a prison 
official must act oppressively or abusively.2982 Due process is not violated by 
examination), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1207 (1988); cf Hensley v. Wilson, 850 F.2d 269, 276-77, 282-
83 (6th Cir. 1988) (disciplinary committee must make independent determination of informant reli-
ability rather than accept investigative officer's conclusions; due process required contemporaneous 
recording of evidence of informant reliability at disciplinary hearing). 
2978. Wo/ff. 418 U.S. at 559-62; see Green v. McCall, 822 F.2d 284, 290-92 (2d Cir. 1987) (due 
process requires that inmate with parole date be allowed representation by counsel, opportunity to 
call and cross-examine witnesses, and de novo hearing into charges before release date changed); cf 
Lanier v. Fair, 876 F.2d 243, 250 (1st Cir. 1989) (in determination of parole date, no due process 
violations when prisoner had written notice of charges, represented by law student, and able to 
address charges); Pedro v. Oregon Parole Bd., 825 F.2d 1396, 1399 (9th Cir. 1987) (in determina-
tion of parole date, no due process violation for prisoner who received written notice of hearing, was 
represented by paralegal, and submitted materials for board's consideration), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 
1017 (1988). 
2979. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972) (prisoner in parole revocation proceedings 
has right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, unless hearing officer specifically finds good 
cause for denying confrontation). 
2980. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973) (right to counsel required by fundamen-
tal fairness in certain parole revocation proceedings); cf Damiano v. Florida Parole & Probation 
Comm'n, 785 F.2d 929, 932 (11th Cir. 1986) (no right to counsel at hearings that determine rather 
than revoke parole). 
2981. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 335-36 (1986) (due process not implicated when 
prisoner slipped on pillow left on stairway by negligent prison official); Gill v. Mooney, 824 F.2d 
192, 195 (2d Cir. 1987) (requiring inmate to climb ladder to paint after complaints by inmate of 
dizziness and nausea negligent act by prison official but not violation of due process); Simmons v. 
Poppell, 837 F.2d 1243, 1244 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (failure to investigate adequately and 
locate radio removed from cell by another prison official negligent but not violation of due process); 
Chambers v. Ingram, 858 F.2d 351, 359-60 (7th Cir. 1988) (erroneously invoking medical emer-
gency for patient and forcing ingestion of psychotropic drugs that resulted in headaches and 
seizures negligent but not violation of due process); Abernathy v. Perry, 869 F.2d 1146, 1148 (8th 
Cir. 1989) (failure to give notice of extension to inmate in administration segregation lack of due 
care but not violation of due process); Hernandez v. Johnston, 833 F.2d 1316, 1319 (9th Cir. 1987) 
(failure to provide adequate training or supervision of prison employees negligent but not violation 
of due process); cf Freedman v. City of Allentown, Pa., 853 F.2d 1111, 1113-14, 1116 (3d Cir. 
1988) (failure of police to recognize "suicidal hesitation cuts" on pretrial detainee who committed 
suicide negligent but did not violate due process); Ortega v. Rowe, 796 F.2d 765, 768 (5th Cir. 
1986) (although Daniels applies to pretrial detainees, due process not violated when state did not 
know of unsanitary conditions of jails), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1013 (1987). 
2982. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331-32; compare Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 838 F.2d 663, 669-70 
(3d Cir. 1988) (allegation that custodial officials acted with reckless indifference stated due process 
claim when pretrial detainee, who was known by officials to have suicidal tendencies, committed 
suicide), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989) and Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409, 413 (9th Cir. 
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unauthorized, intentional deprivations of property if state law provides an 
adequate post-deprivation remedy.2983 
Retained Rights to Equal Treatment. Although prisoners do not forfeit all 
equal protection rights upon incarceration, practices that result in unequal 
treatment among prisoners are permissible if they bear a rational relation to a 
legitimate penal interest.2984 Strict scrutiny is inappropriate because prison-
ers are not a suspect class for equal protection purposes.2985 Separation by 
1988) (failure of officials to protect inmate from stabbing by fellow inmate, allegedly on guard's 
instructions, after inmate warned of attack, more than negligence and stated due process claim) with 
Edwards v. Gilbert, 867 F.2d 1271, 1272, 1275-76 (11th Cir. 1989) (officials did not exhibit deliber-
ate indifference in failing to prevent suicide when inmate had never threatened or attempted sui-
cide). 
Deliberate indifference by prison officials to a prisoner's serious injury or illness may also state a 
claim of cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 
429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976). The eighth amendment's "reckless disregard" standard is discussed in 
Retained Rights Related to Living Conditions, Disciplinary Treatment, and Medical Care in this 
part. 
2983. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533, 536 (1984). In Hudson, a prisoner brought suit 
under § 1983 claiming that a prison guard had intentionally destroyed noncontraband property 
confiscated in a "shakedown" search of his prison cell. /d. at 520. The Court held that if a state 
does not provide a meaningful post-deprivation remedy for the loss occasioned by intentional offi-
cial misconduct, the state will have deprived a prisoner of property in violation of the fourteenth 
amendment. /d. at 533. 
Hudson only applies when the conduct is unauthorized. The post-deprivation hearing is appro-
priate because the state could not have otherwise prevented the deprivation. See Gillihan v. Shil-
linger, 872 F.2d 935, 937-40 (lOth Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (inmate required to pay for return at his 
request to original prison deprived of property in funds). If the deprivation is a result of a state 
policy, the state has the power to prevent the deprivation and must provide a pre-deprivation hear-
ing. /d. 
2984. Compare Dickerson v. Latessa, 872 F.2d 1116, 1119-20 (1st Cir. 1989) ("gatekeeper" stat-
ute, giving one justice of state supreme court ability to approve or reject appeals of capital defend-
ants, did not violate equal protection because rationally related to goals of giving highest court last 
word and preventing frivolous appeals); Mikeska v. Collins, 900 F.2d 833, 837 (3d Cir. 1990) (ad-
ministrative segregation creating unequal privileges, exercise periods, and education programs did 
not violate equal protection because policy rationally related to problems created by inmate's refusal 
to work); Moss v. Clark, 886 F.2d 686, 689 (4th Cir. 1989) (awarding different good time credits to 
inmates based solely on situs of incarceration not violative of equal protection because rationally 
related to government interest in alleviating prison overcrowding and not in violation of fundamen-
tal right nor involving suspect class) and Kalka v. Vasquez, 867 F.2d 546, 547 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(awarding full work credits to inmates who work while half credit per day to inmates who want but 
are not given work rationally related to penal objective of rehabilitation because actual workers 
better able to integrate into society) with Fullan v. Commissioner of Corrections, 891 F.2d 1007, 
1011-12 (2d Cir. 1989) (statute denying free transcript to indigent inmate whose family and friends 
hired his counsel violated equal protection clause because state not entitled to treat family's funds as 
those of inmate), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3229 (1990); Williams v. Lane, 851 F.2d 867, 881-82 (7th 
Cir. 1988) (provisions for programming and living conditions for protective custody inmates vio-
lated equal protection because unequal in comparison with general population and not justified by 
security concerns), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1047 (1989) and Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 
1207 (8th Cir. 1990) (dictum) (disciplinary actions falsely filed against disabled inmates to prevent 
advancement into preferential classification violated equal protection). 
2985. See Dickerson v. Latessa, 872 F.2d 1116, 1119 (1st Cir. 1989) (capital defendants not 
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race does not always constitute an equal protection violation, 2986 nor do poli-
cies that involve unequal treatment of prisoners based on religious prefer-
ence,2987 gender,2988 or physical handicaps.2989 Furthermore, prisoners may 
suspect class for equal protection purposes); Zipkin v. Heckler, 790 F.2d 16, 18 (2d Cir. 1986) 
(incarcerated persons not suspect class for equal protection purposes); Williams v. Lynaugh, 814 
F.2d 205, 208 (5th Cir.) (capital defendants not suspect class for equal protection purposes), cert. 
denied, 484 U.S. 935 (1987); Thornton v. Hunt, 852 F.2d 526, 527 (lith Cir. 1988) (per curiam) 
(statute that denies good time accumulation for prisoners sentenced to more than 10 years not 
violation of equal protection because no singling out of suspect class or impinging on fundamental 
right). 
2986. See Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 334 (1968) (Black, J., concurring) ("prison authori-
ties have the right ... in particularized circumstances, to take into account racial tensions in main-
taining security, discipline, and good order"). Although the Court has not dealt with this issue 
since Lee, it has, in dictum, cited Lee for the proposition set forth in Black's concurrence. See 
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523 (1984); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979). 
Unlike Title VII actions, claims of equal protection violations require allegations of intentional 
discrimination. See David K. v. Lane, 839 F.2d 1265, 1273 (7th Cir. 1988) (prison policy of limit-
ing gang activity while permitting gang membership, which had disproportionate impact on white 
inmates, did not violate equal protection absent showing of intentional discriminatory motive); Fos-
ter v. Wyrick, 823 F.2d 218, 221 (8th Cir. 1987) (allegation that facially neutral prison employment 
practices have discriminatory impact on black inmates did not state equal protection claim when no 
allegation of intentional discrimination). 
2987. Compare Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 n.2 (1972) (per curiam) (although prisoners 
guaranteed reasonable opportunity to exercise religion under free exercise clause, every religious 
sect need not be granted identical personnel or facilities); Benjamin v. Coughlin, 905 F.2d 571, 579 
(2d Cir. 1990) (prison policy that granted Rastafarians limited right to wear crowns but granted 
Jews and Muslims unlimited right to wear religious headgear did not violate equal protection be-
cause differential treatment due to greater security concern with crown's larger size); Thompson v. 
Kentucky, 712 F.2d 1078, 1082 (6th Cir. 1983) (policy denying Muslim prisoners equal time with 
Christian prisoners in prison chapel did not violate equal protection because justified by administra-
tive convenience); Butler-Bey v. Frey, 811 F.2d 449,454 (8th Cir. 1987) (withholding of portion of 
funds allocated to members of Moorish Science Temple due to schism in group not equal protection 
violation because reasonable opportunity to practice faith still available) and Allen v. Toombs, 827 
F.2d 563, 568-69 (9th Cir. 1987) (weekly access to Pipe Bearer for Native Americans in disciplinary 
segregation not violation of equal protection, even though Catholic and Protestant inmates had 
immediate access to spiritual guidance) with Udey v. Kastner, 805 F.2d 1218, 1220 n.2 (5th Cir. 
1986) (dictum) (providing acceptable dietary alternatives to practitioners of "majority" religions 
but failing to do so for practitioners of less common religions would raise serious equal protection 
concerns) and Reed v. Faulkner, 842 F.2d 960, 962, 964 (7th Cir. 1988) (application of hair length 
regulation to Rastafarians but not to American Indians, without reason, violated equal protection). 
The religious rights of prisoners are discussed in this section in Retained Freedoms of Speech, Reli-
gion, and Association. 
2988. Compare Morrow v. Harwell, 768 F.2d 619, 626 (5th Cir. 1985) (no equal protection viola-
tion when greater time for public visit granted for males when males constituted greater proportion 
of population and no individual inmate received more time based on gender) and Jackson v. Thorn-
burgh, 907 F.2d 194, 196-98 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (no equal protection violation where men sentenced to 
District of Columbia penal facilities benefit from early release statute while female inmates do not 
because women serving more than one year must be sentenced to federal facility not covered by 
statute and statute rationally related to alleviating overcrowding in facilities) with Glover v. John-
son, 855 F.2d 277, 281 (6th Cir. 1988) (dictum) (affording male inmates education and training 
opportunities not afforded to female inmates violated equal protection). 
2989. See Bonner v. Lewis, 857 F.2d 559, 560, 565 (9th Cir. 1988) (prison officials' failure to 
provide deaf mute with interpreter services did not violate equal protection). 
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be treated differently based on the nature of their crimes. 2990 
Retained Rights to Assistance of Counsel. Prisoners retain a sixth amend-
ment right to counsel for criminal prosecutions arising while they are incar-
cerated.2991 The right does not extend to disciplinary actions,2992 nor does it 
apply to administrative segregation based on suspected criminal activity un-
less the prisoner has been charged with a crime. 2993 Assistance of counsel 
may be provided at a court's discretion once the prisoner has established a 
prima facie case in a civil rights action2994 or if required for fundamental 
fairness in parole revocation proceedings. 2995 
Rights Retained by Pretrial Detainees. Pretrial detainees, who have not 
been convicted of any crimes, retain at least those constitutional rights that 
are enjoyed by convicted prisoners. 2996 The due process clause prohibits 
2990. See Dickerson v. Latessa, 872 F.2d 1116, 1119 (1st Cir. 1989) (special status for appeals of 
capital defendants to protect from frivolous actions not equal protection violation); U.S. v. Roy, 830 
F.2d 628, 639 (7th Cir. 1987) (more severe maximum penalty for escape by prisoner charged with 
felony than for one charged with misdemeanor not violation of equal protection), cert. denied, 484 
U.S. 1068 (1988); Mahfouz v. Lockhart, 826 F.2d 791, 794 (8th Cir. 1987) (denying sex offenders 
access to work-study release program does not violate equal protection); Mayner v. Callahan, 873 
F.2d 1300, 1302 (9th Cir. 1989) (more severe treatment of life inmates who escape late in 
mandatory minimum sentence as opposed to those who escape early in sentence rationally related to 
penal objectives); Hendking v. Smith, 781 F.2d 850, 852 (11th Cir. 1986) (differential treatment of 
sex offenders does not violate equal protection because nature of crime different). 
2991. U.S. v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 187, 192 (1984). The right attaches only at or after the 
initiation of adversary judicial proceedings against the defendant. Id. 
A prisoner's sixth amendment right differs from her right of access to courts. The sixth amend-
ment right consists of the right to counsel in criminal matters that occur while the prisoner is 
incarcerated. The right of access consists of the right to judicial proceedings to challenge convic-
tions or the duration and conditions of confinement. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 827 (1977). 
The extent to which a prisoner's right of access includes a right to the assistance of counsel is 
discussed in Right of Access to Courts in this section. 
2992. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 315 (1975); see Brown v. Frey, 889 F.2d 159, 169 (8th 
Cir. 1989) (no constitutional right to counsel substitute for literate inmate not facing complex 
charges in disciplinary hearing), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1156 (1990); Smith v. Maschner, 899 F.2d 
940, 950 (lOth Cir. 1990) (no right to specific inmate's legal assistance if other assistance available 
in disciplinary hearing); cf Bostic v. Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267, 1274 (9th Cir. 1989) (inmate cannot 
claim ineffective assistance of counsel at disciplinary hearing). 
2993. See U.S. v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 182, 192 (1984) (no right to counsel when prisoner 
suspected of murder placed in administrative segregation because not yet charged with crime). The 
lower court in Gouveia had held that the sixth amendment's guarantee of a speedy trial is violated 
unless prisoners are supplied with attorneys within 90 days of placement in administrative segrega-
tion. /d. at 186, 189-90. The Supreme Court expressly declined to rule on when the sixth amend-
ment speedy trial right attaches in this context. Id. at 190 n.6. 
2994. This issue is discussed in PROCEDURAL MEANS OF ENFORCEMENT UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
in this part. 
2995. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973) (fundamental fairness may require right 
to counsel in certain parole revocation proceedings). 
2996. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979); see City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 
463 U.S. 239, 244 (1982) (pretrial detainees enjoy same due process right to medical treatment as 
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punishment of pretrial detainees2997 and protects them from the use of exces-
sive force that amounts to punishment.2998 To determine whether a particu-
lar hardship imposed on a pretrial detainee comports with due process, a 
court must determine whether the disability imposed is for the purposes of 
punishment or whether it is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental 
purpose. 2999 
The due process clause also imposes affirmative obligations on the state in 
the treatment of pretrial detainees. In City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen-
eral Hospital, 3000 the Supreme Court held that pretrial detainees must receive 
at least the same standard of medical treatment as prisoners. 3001 Further, in 
prisoners); Dzana v. Foti, 829 F.2d 558, 562 (5th Cir. 1987) (detainee facing disciplinary segrega-
tion and loss of bond entitled to same level of process guaranteed to prisoner in disciplinary hear-
ing); Johnson-El v. Schoemehl, 878 F.2d 1043, 1051 (8th Cir. 1989) (pretrial detainee has 
substantial interest in effective communication with counsel and in access to legal materials); Bee v. 
Greaves, 910 F.2d 686, 688 (lOth Cir. 1990) (liberty interest of inmate in remaining free from 
unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs indisputably extends to pretrial detainee). The 
rights of pretrial detainees must be analyzed under the due process clause rather than the eighth 
amendment because guilt has not been adjudicated. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 535; see Martin v. Tyson, 
845 F.2d 1451, 1458 (7th Cir.) (per curiam) (limitation on detainee's telephone access and monitor-
ing of calls for security reasons not violative of due process), cen. denied, 488 U.S. 863 (1988). 
2997. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 535 n.16; compare Lyons v. Powell, 838 F.2d 28, 31 (1st Cir. 1988) 
(detainee confined to cell for 22-23 hours per day for 27-day period and forced to sleep on floor 
mattress stated claim under due process clause); Cooper v. Dyke, 814 F.2d 941, 948-49 (4th Cir. 
1987) (pretrial detainee whose gunshot wound overlooked by police need only show punishment, 
not cruel and unusual punishment); Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 261 (7th Cir.) 
(dictum) (fugitive arrested in Honduras and tortured during flight to United States would state due 
process claim if tortured during pretrial detention), cen. denied, Ill S. Ct. 209 (1990); Gobel v. 
Maricopa County, 867 F.2d 1201, 1206 (9th Cir. 1989) (detainee confined in cell for four to seven 
hours in 108 degree heat without food, water, or adequate ventilation stated due process claim) and 
Hewitt v. Jarrard, 786 F.2d 1080, 1085-86 (11th Cir. 1986) (juvenile in pretrial detention suffered 
due process deprivation when physically abused, denied medical attention, and placed in isolation) 
with Van Cleave v. U.S., 854 F.2d 82, 84 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (locking property of pretrial 
detainee in safe until next morning did not violate due process because action served legitimate 
government interest of securing property and not intended as punishment) and Green v. Baron, 879 
F.2d 305, 310 (8th Cir. 1989) (deprivation oflight, heat, ventilation, sanitation, and proper diet not 
violation of due process if for legitimate penal goals and not punishment). 
The failure to provide detainees with mattress and bed or bunks violates due process. See Lareau 
v. Manson, 651 F.2d 96, 105 (2d Cir. 1981) (prison's use of floor mattresses for pretrial detainees 
unconstitutional regardless of length of use by a detainee); Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 
F.2d 1439, 1448 (9th Cir. 1989) (county jail's failure to provide pretrial detainee with bed or mat-
tress violated due process). 
2998. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 535-39. 
2999. Id. at 538-39. The Court warned that courts should ordinarily defer to the expert judg-
ment of corrections officials as to whether a restriction is reasonably related to security interests, 
absent substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the responses are exaggerated. Id. at 540-
41 n.23; see Masters v. Crouch, 872 F.2d 1248, 1253-57 (6th Cir. 1989) (detainee arrested for traffic 
violation stated due process claim when strip searched for contraband), cert. denied. 110 S. Ct. 503 
(1989). 
3000. 463 u.s. 239 (1982). 
3001. /d. at 244. The Court refrained from delineating the scope of the duty under due process 
to provide medical care to pretrial detainees. Id. The Court noted, without elaboration, that the 
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City of Canton v. Harris, 3002 the Court held that a "deliberate indifference" 
standard would govern the failure of adequate medical attention resulting 
from a failure to train officials. 3003 
state had "fulfilled its constitutional obligation" by providing the detainee with prompt medical 
treatment following his injury. /d. at 245; compare Boring v. Kozakiewicz, 833 F.2d 468, 473-74 
(3d Cir. 1987) (no due process violation when elective surgery deferred safely for brief detention 
period prior to trial, because not serious medical need requiring prompt medical attention), cert. 
denied, 485 U.S. 991 (1988); Mitchell v. Aluisi, 872 F.2d 577, 578-79, 581 (4th Cir. 1989) (no due 
process violation when medication of hypertensive detainee confiscated, despite confinement for 3 
and 1/2 days resulting in nausea and headaches) and Danese v. Asman, 875 F.2d 1239, 1244 (6th 
Cir. 1989) (no due process violation when detainee not screened for suicidal tendencies because not 
included in general right to medical care and no right to suicide prevention facilities), cert. denied, 
110 S. Ct. 1473 (1990) with Thomas v. Kippermann, 846 F.2d 1009, 1011 (5th Cir. 1988) (per 
curiam) (allegation of denial of "mental medication" to detainee adequate to establish due process 
claim); Boswell v. County of Sherburne, 849 F.2d 1117, 1122 (8th Cir. 1988) (failure of prison 
officials to provide medical assistance to pregnant pretrial detainee who was bleeding, cramping, 
and crying, stated due process claim), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1010 (1989); Martin v. Bd. of County 
Commissioners, 909 F.2d 402, 406 (lOth Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (alleged deliberate disregard for 
information on detainee's serious medical condition and refusal to contact detainee's doctor before 
arresting and moving her grounds for due process claim); Thomas v. Town of Davie, 847 F.2d 771, 
772-73 (11th Cir. 1988) (accident victim stated claim of due process violation when alleged that 
handcuffed, received roadside sobriety test, and detained until bail posted rather than receiving 
medical attention obviously necessary). 
3002. 109 S. Ct. 1197 (1989). 
3003. /d. at 1204. When a detainee was asked if medical care was needed, she responded unintel-
ligibly, and, after falling to the ftoor, was taken to the hospital and diagnosed as having emotional 
problems. /d. at 1200-01. The detainee claimed that the lack of adequate police training resulted in 
her injury and complications. /d. at 1201. The Court held that the "deliberate indifference" stan-
dard must govern claims asserting a failure to train adequately. /d. at 1204. The Court concluded 
the detainee sufficiently stated a due process claim because the level of training was obviously defi-
cient, and in light of the official's duties, the inadequacies were likely to result in violation of the 
rights of detainees. /d. at 1205; see Bums v. City of Galveston, Texas, 905 F.2d 100, 104 (5th Cir. 
1990) (no deliberate indifference where police inadequately trained in suicide prevention because no 
absolute right of detainees to psychological screening for suicide prevention); Redman v. County of 
San Diego, 896 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1990) (no deliberate indifference where prison officials suspected 
possible attack on inmate with "young and tender" profile by aggressive homosexual cellmate). 
There is no general requirement to evaluate all detainees for suicidal potential. See Williams v. 
Board of West Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 465-66 (3d Cir. 1989) (jail officials lacking knowledge of 
detainee's suicidal tendencies not liable when for failure to remove belt used in suicide); Belcher v. 
Oliver, 898 F.2d 32, 35-36 (4th Cir. 1990) (jail officials lacking reason to believe intoxicated detainee 
would commit suicide not liable for suicide); Gagne v. City of Galveston, Texas, 805 F.2d 558, 559-
60 (5th Cir. 1986) (officers entitled to qualified immunity for suicide of arrestee where they failed to 
"uncover" his suicidal tendencies), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1021 (1987); Danese v. Asman, 875 F.2d 
1239, 1243-44 (6th Cir. 1989) (officials entitled to qualified immunity where no knowledge that 
intoxicated detainee was seriously contemplating suicide), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1473 (1990); State 
Bank of St. Charles v. Carnic, 712 F.2d 1140, 1146 (7th Cir.) (knowledge that prisoner acting 
violently or freakishly not "synonymous with having reason to know that the violence might be-
come self- directed"), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 995 (1983); Estate of Cartwright v. City of Concord, 
856 F.2d 1437, 1438 (9th Cir. 1988) (city officials not liable for suicide of pretrial detainee where no 
reason to believe detainee suicidal); Edwards v. Gilbert, 867 F.2d 1271, 1274-76 (11th Cir. 1989) 
(officers entitled to qualified immunity for failing to prevent suicide of prisoner where no suicide 
threatened or attempted). If the police have knowledge of a detainee's suicide potential, however, 
the failure to protect against a suicide can constitute deliberate indifference. See Buffington v. Balti-
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The Supreme Court has stated that courts should usually defer to prison 
officials in determining whether a particular regulation is reasonably related 
to a legitimate interest other than punishment. 3004 The Court stressed its 
hesitancy to substitute its "judgment on these difficult and sensitive matters 
of institutional administration and security for that of 'the persons who are 
actually charged with and trained in the running' of such facilities."3005 The 
Court has held that neither blanket prohibitions on contact visits for pretrial 
detainees3006 nor routine body cavity searches after contact visits3007 violate 
the Constitution. Furthermore, neither "double celling"3008 nor random 
"shakedown" searches of a detainee's cell without observance by the de-
tainee3009 violate due process. 3010 
PROCEDURAL MEANS OF ENFORCEMENT UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
Provisions and Applicability. Under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 
1871,3011 a prisoner may seek redress when a person acting under color of 
more County, 913 F.2d 113, 120 (4th Cir. 1990) (deliberate indifference when police, who appre-
hended detainee for attempted suicide, placed detainee unmonitored in cell where he committed 
suicide), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 1106 (1991). 
3004. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 540-41 n.23 (1979); Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 587-
88 (1984); see Mitchell v. Aluisi, 872 F.2d 577, 581 (4th Cir. 1989) (court defers to officials on 
questions of taking of contraband, possessions of detainees, and training of employees absent delib-
erate indifference). 
3005. Block. 468 U.S. at 588 (quoting Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 562); cf. Johnson-E) v. Schoemehl, 
878 F.2d 1043, 1051-53 (8th Cir. 1989) (no deference when officials restricted detainee's right to 
effective communication with counsel and access to legal materials). 
3006. Block. 468 U.S. at 589. In Block, contact visits were prohibited but private, unmonitored 
noncontact visits were permitted. Id. The Court upheld this distinction because it was not arbi-
trary and served valid penal interests. Id.; see O'Bryan v. County of Saginaw, 741 F.2d 283, 285 
(6th Cir. 1984) (pretrial detainees have no constitutional right to contact visits; no violation when 
jailers terminated contact visits and reimposed "barrier" visitation); Martin v. Tyson, 845 F.2d 
1451, 1455 (7th Cir.) (per curiam) (policy limiting number of visitors and length of visits to pretrial 
detainees and prohibiting contact visits justified by small size of jail and number of people), cert. 
denied, 488 U.S. 863 (1988). 
3007. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 558-60. 
3008. Id. at 543; see Duran v. Elrod, 760 F.2d 756, 760-61 (7th Cir. 1985) (ban on double bunk-
ing not constitutionally mandated and must give way to larger community interests). 
3009. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 555-57; see Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 591 (1984) (discretion 
to search individual cells during inmates' absence justified by security concerns for prisoners and 
guards). 
3010. The fourth amendment implications of these activities when applied to prisoners are dis-
cussed in Retained Rights Related to Searches, Seizures, and Personal Privacy in this section. 
3011. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). This statute provides: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of 
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be 
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 
redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the 
District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia. 
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state law3012 deprives the prisoner of rights guaranteed by the Constitution or 
federallaws. 3013 Section 1983 supplements available state remedies designed 
to vindicate violations of constitutional rights. 3014 
Section 1983 is not a substitute for a writ of habeas corpus. 301 s In Preiser 
v. Rodriguez, 3016 the Supreme Court explained that a prisoner seeking dam-
ages for deprivation of constitutional or federally created rights may properly 
bring suit under section 1983,3017 whereas a prisoner challenging "the fact or 
/d. 
3012. In Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982), the Supreme Court enunciated a 
two-part test for determining whether a private individual has acted under color of state law. First, 
the claimed deprivation must result from the exercise of a right or privilege having its source in 
state authority, and second, under the facts of the instant case, the private party must be fairly 
characterized as a state actor. /d. at 937. The Court has provided at least three examples of con-
duct that satisfies the "under color of state law" requirement of§ 1983. First, in U.S. v. Classic, 
313 U.S. 299 (1941), the Court held that "(m]isuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and 
made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken 
'under color of' state law." /d. at 326; see Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981) (prison 
official considered state actor under § 1983); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184-87 (1961) (police 
officer considered state actor under§ 1983). Second, in Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 
( 1970), the Court held that to act under color of state law, a defendant need not be an officer of the 
state; it is sufficient that she "is a willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents." 
/d. at 152 (quoting U.S. v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 (1966)). Third, the Court has held that private 
persons who are authorized to exercise state authority are deemed to be acting "under color of state 
law". West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988). In Atkins, the Court held that a private physician under 
contract with North Carolina to provide medical services for prisoners was acting "under color of 
state law." Id at 57. The Court has held, however, that a public defender does not act "under color 
of state law" when performing the traditional functions of counsel on behalf of a criminal defend-
ant, despite the fact that the attorney derives her authority from state law. Polk County v. Dodson, 
454 U.S. 312, 315, 321 (1981); cf. Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 919-20 (1984) (although ap-
pointed counsel in state criminal prosecution not acting under color of state law in normal course of 
conducting defense, one who conspires with state officials to deprive client of constitutional rights 
may be found to act under color of state law); Deck v. Leftridge, 771 F.2d 1168, 1170 (8th Cir. 
1985) (per curiam) (dictum) (although allegations that public defender conspired with judges to 
deprive inmate of federally protected rights may satisfy "under color of state law" requirement in 
§ 1983 action, claim dismissed because no conspiracy pleaded). 
3013. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Prisoners who are deprived of constitutional rights by a person 
acting under color of federal authority may seek redress directly under the Constitution. Carlson v. 
Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1980); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 396-97 
(1971). 
3014. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961), overruled on other grounds by Monell v. Dep't 
of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). A § 1983 action must allege a violation of federal law. 
Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 817 n.4 (1984). Mere torts committed by government 
officials are not a sufficient basis for a suit under this section. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 700-
01 (1976) (state tort of defamation not cognizable under§ 1983 merely because state official com-
mitted tort). The constitutional standards of care controlling prison officials are discussed in PRIS-
ONER's SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS in this part. 
3015. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). 
3016. 411 u.s. 475 (1973). 
3017. /d. at 499 & n. 14; see Wolffv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 554-55 (1974) (prisoner's § 1983 
suit for damages and injunctive relief proper when claim alleged unconstitutionality of disciplinary 
· proceedings, inmate legal assistance program, and mail inspection regulations). 
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length of his custody" must pursue his claim through a writ of habeas 
corpus.3°18 The appellate courts have generally applied Preiser to bar a sec-
tion 1983 claim if the suit affects the fact or duration of confinement in any 
manner.Jot9 
Generally, a properly formulated section 1983 suit does not require a 
claimant to exhaust available state judicial or administrative remedies before 
seeking federal judicial relief. 3020 In 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, however, Congress 
3018. Preiser, 411 U.S. at 500 (action seeking restoration of good time credits improperly 
brought under § 1983). The Court also noted that a federal habeas corpus claim may "also be 
available to challenge ... prison conditions." Id. at 499 (dictum). 
3019. Compare Dickerson v. Walsh, 750 F.2d 150, 153-54 (1st Cir. 1984) (prisoner challenging 
state post-conviction review procedures on basis of trial by jury and equal protection rights viola-
tions must proceed through habeas corpus because relief ultimately sought is release); Brown v. 
Fauver, 819 F.2d 395, 397 (3d Cir. 1987) (prisoner seeking restoration of good time credits taken 
from him as result of conviction must proceed through habeas corpus); Leonard v. Hammond, 804 
F.2d 838, 840 (4th Cir. 1986) (prisoner challenging imprisonment for civil contempt arising out of 
failure to pay court-ordered child support must proceed through habeas corpus); Johnson v. Texas, 
878 F.2d 904, 905 (5th Cir. 1989) (prisoner claiming false arrest and use of perjured testimony must 
exhaust state remedies because suit amounted to habeas corpus claim); Otfet v. Solem, 823 F.2d 
1256, 1259 (8th Cir. 1987) (prisoner seeking damages for loss of good time credits essentially chal-
lenging duration of sentence and must proceed through habeas corpus) and Smith v. Maschner, 899 
F.2d 940, 951 (lOth Cir. 1990) (same) with Georgevich v. Strauss, 772 F.2d 1078, 1087 (3d Cir. 
1985) (prisoner challenging state parole statute on equal protection grounds properly brought suit 
under§ 1983 because suit challenged process, not actual duration of confinement), cert. denied, 415 
U.S. 1028 (1986); Alexander v. Ware, 714 F.2d 416, 418-19 (5th Cir. 1983) (prisoner's systematic 
challenge to prison disciplinary procedures of charging minor violations, entering summary guilty 
findings, and giving prisoners unfavorable good time classifications properly brought under § 1983); 
Hensley v. Wilson, 850 F.2d 269, 271-72 (6th Cir. 1988) (prisoner challenging prison disciplinary 
hearings properly brought suit under § 1983 when hearings conducted without any investigation 
into reliability of informants); Smith v. Springer, 859 F.2d 31, 33-34 (7th Cir. 1988) (prisoner alleg-
ing police fabricated evidence properly brought suit under§ 1983) and Young v. Armontrout, 795 
F.2d 55, 56 (8th Cir. 1986) (prisoner's habeas corpus suit claiming violation of eighth amendment 
right to adequate psychiatric care remanded with instructions to district court to treat as § 1983 
claim of deliberate indifference to prisoner's medical needs). 
The Third Circuit has held that when a prisoner seeks both release from confinement and dam-
ages for violations of his constitutional rights in a section 1983 suit, a court should not dismiss the 
damage claim merely because the petition for release should be brought in an habeas corpus action. 
Harper v. Jeffries, 808 F.2d 281, 283 (3d Cir. 1986). In such a case, the court should stay the 
§ 1983 proceedings pending the outcome of the petition for habeas corpus. I d. at 285. The Eighth 
Circuit has held that a § 1983 suit which, if successful, would have the effect of releasing a prisoner 
is in effect a habeas proceeding and should be stayed pending exhaustion of state remedies. Otfet v. 
Solem, 823 F.2d 1256, 1259 (8th Cir. 1987). 
3020. Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982); see Patterson v. Coughlin, 761 F.2d 
886, 891 (2d Cir. 1985) (prisoner need not exhaust state remedies in suit claiming prison officials 
violated due process rights by not according adequate hearing before final disciplinary decision), 
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1100 (1986); Georgevich v. Strauss, 772 F.2d 1078, 1085-87 (3d Cir. 1985) 
(prisoners need not exhaust state remedies when challenging state parole statute on equal protection 
grounds), cen. denied, 415 U.S. 1028 (1986); Bressman v. Farrier, 900 F.2d 1305, 1307 (8th. Cir. 
1990) (prisoners need not exhaust state remedies when challenging conditions of confinement and 
retaliatory discipline), cert. denied, IllS. Ct. 1090 (1991); Rutherford v. City of Berkeley, 780 F.2d 
1444, 1447-48 (9th Cir. 1986) (plaintiff need not exhaust existing state remedies in order to bring 
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created an exception to this rule, granting courts discretion to continue the 
section 1983 cases of adult prisoners up to ninety days pending the exhaus-
tion of available administrative remedies. 3021 A court may order exhaustion 
under this section only if the United States Attorney General has certified or 
the court has established that the state administrative procedures are in sub-
stantial compliance with the standards set forth in section 1997e.3022 
Federal district courts have jurisdiction to hear section 1983 claims under 
§ 1983 case against police for brutality); Gwin v. Snow, 870 F.2d 616, 624 (lith Cir. 1989) (pris-
oner need not exhaust state remedies in suit challenging parole board's procedure of allegedly con-
sidering race as a factor in its parole decisions). 
The circuits are split, however, on the issue of the exhaustion requirement in hybrid petitions 
involving both habeas corpus and section 1983 claims. Compare Lyons v. U.S. Marshals, 840 F.2d 
202, 204-05 (3d Cir. 1988) (exhaustion required in every hybrid case unless administrative remedies 
futile, unambiguous violation exists, or administrative procedure would cause irreparable injury) 
and Hernandez v. Spencer, 780 F.2d 504, 505 (5th Cir. 1986) (exhaustion required when allegations 
of complaint could give rise to either habeas corpus or § 1983 remedy) with Veins v. Daniels, 871 
F.2d 1328, 1334 (7th Cir. 1989) (prisoner seeking damages as well as restoration of good-time cred-
its may proceed with damages claim in federal court while exhausting remedies in state court with 
regard to restoration of good time). The exhaustion requirement for habeas corpus relief is dis-
cussed in HABEAS RELIEF FOR STATE PRISONERS and HABEAS RELIEF FOR FEDERAL PRISONERS in 
Part V. 
3021. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)(l) (1988). In Patsy, the Supreme Court stated that section 1997e is a 
"narrow exception to the general no-exhaustion rule" for suits brought under section 1983. 457 
U.S. at 510. The Court expressly limited exhaustion to those cases falling under the specifications 
of section 1997e and refused to sanction judicial discretion to impose a general exhaustion require-
ment. /d. at 509-12; see Francis v. Marquez, 741 F.2d 1127, 1128 (9th Cir. 1984) (error to dismiss 
prisoner's suit claiming segregation without proper hearing for failure to exhaust state remedies 
without granting continuance required under § 1997e to afford prisoner chance to exhaust adminis-
trative remedies); Kennedy v. Herschler, 655 F.2d 210, 211-12 (lOth Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (error 
to dismiss prisoner's suit claiming harassment, denial of access to court, and denial of right to assist 
other inmates with legal matters for failure to exhaust state remedies without allowing continuance 
for ninety days to give prisoner opportunity to pursue administrative remedies); cf. Lay v. Ander-
son, 837 F.2d 231, 233 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (no error to dismiss after continuance granted 
when prisoner failed to exhaust prison remedies during interim by pursuing § 1997e prison griev-
ance proceeding). 
3022. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)(2) (1988); see Lewis v. Meyer, 815 F.2d 43, 46 (7th Cir. 1987) (pre-
mature for court to certify Wisconsin's administrative remedies as in substantial compliance with 
acceptable minimal standards when Attorney General had not certified and court did not inquire 
into extent of inmate participation in grievance procedures). Section 1997e(b)(2) requires that the 
minimum standards shall provide: 
(A) for an advisory role for employees and inmates of any jail, prison, or other correc-
tional institution (at the most decentralized level as is reasonably possible), in the formula-
tion, implementation, and operation of the system; 
(B) specific maximum time limits for written replies to grievances with reasons thereto 
at each decision level within the system; 
(C) for priority processing of grievances which are of an emergency nature, including 
matters in which delay would subject the grievant to substantial risk of personal injury or 
other damages; 
(D) for safeguards to avoid reprisals against any grievant or participant in the resolu-
tion of a grievance; and 
(E) for independent review of the disposition of grievances, including alleged reprisals, 
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28 U.S.C. § 1343.3023 A prisoner filing in federal court need not satisfy any 
jurisdictional amount.3024 Venue is determined under the same statutory 
provision that applies to all civil actions.3025 
Federal courts are authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 to allow a prisoner 
to file claims under section 1983 in forma pauperis and without the assistance 
of counsel. 3026 Courts hold such pro se complaints to less stringent standards 
than formal pleadings drafted by an attorney3027 and liberally construe such 
complaints when determining whether they state a cause of action.3028 
by a person or other entity not under the direct supervision or direct control of the 
institution. 
/d.; see 28 C.F.R. §§ 40.1-22 (1989) (detailing specific minimum standards for inmate grievance 
procedures and method for obtaining certification). 
In Mann v. Adams, 846 F.2d 589 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 898 (1988), the 
Ninth Circuit held that although section 1997e provides that states may voluntarily submit griev-
ance procedures for certification, a state's failure to do so does not give the prisoner a cause of 
action. /d. at 590; see 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d) (failure of state to adopt grievance procedure shall not 
constitute basis for action under§ 1997e(a) or (c)). 
3023. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3)-(4) (1988); see Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129 n.ll (1980) 
(federal district courts have original jurisdiction over § 1983 claims only when substantive right 
allegedly violated is secured by the Constitution or federal statute providing for civil rights); Chap-
man v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 602-03 & n.l (1979) (federal district courts 
have original jurisdiction over § 1983 claims). 
3024. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3)-(4) (1988); see also id. § 133l(a). A state court that has jurisdiction 
over state law actions similar to section 1983 may not decline to entertain a section 1983 action in 
the absence of a "valid excuse." Howlett v. Rose, 110 S. Ct. 2430, 2439-42 (1990). Although the 
Court did not delineate a list of "valid excuses," it did note that on each of the three occasions in 
which the Court found an excuse to be valid, the excuse "involved a neutral rule of judicial adminis-
tration," such as lack of personal jurisdiction or forum non conveniens. /d. at 2442. 
3025. 28 U.S.C. § 139l(b) (1988). A party seeking redress in federal court under§ 1983 may file 
only in the judicial district where all the defendants reside or in which the claim arose, unless 
otherwise provided by law. /d. 
3026. /d. § 1915(a)-(c). 
3027. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (per curiam); compare Bass v. Jackson, 790 
F.2d 260, 262-63 (2d Cir. 1986) (even though prisoner made "thin" claim that officials acted with 
deliberate indifference to pending violence, cause of action exists because pro se complaint held to 
more lenient standard than those prepared by attorneys and claim could be supported with aid of 
discovery) with Glick v. Gutbrod, 782 F.2d 754, 755 n.l, 756-57 (7th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (court 
properly dismissed case when defendant exhibited ftagrant disregard of court orders, complaint 
alleged meritless claims, and brief "woefully inadequate," despite fact that court should hold prose 
complaints to lesser standards) and Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 1986) (en 
bane) (court properly dismissed pro se complaint when any amendment would not overcome judi-
cial and prosecutorial immunities, despite fact that pro se complaints held to lesser standard). 
3028. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam) (prose complaint should not 
be dismissed for failure to state claim unless it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no 
facts in support of claim that would entitle him to relief; prisoner should be allowed to introduce 
evidence of injuries and deprivation of rights caused by solitary confinement to support § 1983 
claim); Lyons v. Powell, 838 F.2d 28, 31 (1st Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (prose complaint alleging 
deprivation of liberty without due process of law improperly dismissed for failure to state claim 
when plaintiff alleged confinement to cell for 22 to 23 hours per day for 27-day period); Holloway v. 
Lockhart, 792 F.2d 760, 761-62 (8th Cir. 1986) (prose complaint alleging prison officials arbitrarily 
revoked prisoner's privileges to possess radio and carbon paper improperly dismissed for failure to 
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Moreover, courts are reluctant to dismiss a claim solely on procedural 
grounds, 3029 and they usually allow prisoners to correct deficiencies by 
amendment.3030 Nevertheless, courts will dismiss prose complaints that are 
frivolous or malicious,3031 or that are brought by an inmate who lacks 
standing. 3032 
state claim); Moreland v. Wharton, 899 F.2d 1168, 1170-71 (lith Cir. 1990) (prose complaint 
alleging inadequate medical care improperly dismissed without conducting "sufficient inquiry" into 
realistic chances of success when complaint presents "arguable basis in law"); cj Neitzke v. Wil-
liams, 490 U.S. 319, 326-29 (1989) (pro se complaint alleging denial of medical treatment not auto-
matically frivolous when fails to state claim; § 1915 (d) "refers to a more limited set of claims than 
does rule 12(b)(6)"). 
3029. See Villante v. Dep't of Corrections, 786 F.2d 516, 523 (2d Cir. 1986) (district court erred 
in granting summary judgment when prisoner not given adequate discovery opportunity); Kelley v. 
McGinnis, 899 F.2d 612, 615 (7th Cir. 1990) (district court erred in granting summary judgment 
against prisoner without giving prisoner notice or opportunity to present counter-affidavits); Reyn-
olds v. Foree, 771 F.2d 1179, 1181 (8th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (district court abused discretion by 
dismissing complaint when prisoner failed to appear at pretrial hearing, because incarcerated in 
another state); Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409, 411-12 (9th Cir. 1988) (district court erred in 
failing to provide pro se claimant with fair notice of requirements of summary judgment rule before 
granting defendant's motion for summary judgment). 
3030. See Elliott v. Bronson, 872 F.2d 20, 22 (2d Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (district court abused 
discretion in dismissing complaint without leave to file amended pleading when prisoner's pro se 
complaint failed to make short and plain statement of claim as required by rule 8 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure); Mills v. Criminal Dist. Court, 837 F.2d 677, 679-80 (5th Cir. 1988) 
(district court erred in dismissing with prejudice pro se conspiracy complaint that failed to state 
claim upon which relief could be granted; court should have dismissed without prejudice to allow 
plaintiff to amend complaint); Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep't., 839 F.2d 621, 623-25 
(9th Cir. 1988) (district court erred in dismissing amended complaint without leave to amend and in 
failing to notify plaintiff of deficiencies in allegations under § 1983). 
3031. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1988); compare Pugh v. Parish of St. Tammany, 875 F.2d 436, 439 
(5th Cir. 1989) (prose complaint properly dismissed as frivolous when defendants absolutely im-
mune from damages); Moses v. Parwatikar, 813 F.2d 891, 892 (8th Cir.) (prose complaint alleging 
that conspiracy abrogates absolute immunity clearly frivolous and properly dismissed), cert. denied, 
484 U.S. 832 (1987) and Harris v. Menendez, 817 F.2d 737, 741 (11th Cir. 1987) (probationer's suit 
claiming perjury and conspiracy to revoke probation correctly dismissed when defendants enjoyed 
immunity from damages and action frivolous) with Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989) 
(in forma pauperis complaint not automatically frivolous so as to warrant sua sponte dismissal 
merely because it fails to state claim); Brooks v. Seiter, 779 F.2d 1177, 1181 (6th Cir. 1985) (pris-
oner's complaint alleging deprivation of mail order materials stated colorable claim of first amend-
ment violation and not frivolous) and Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989) (prose 
complaint alleging unsanitary conditions at prison constituted cruel and unusual punishment not 
frivolous even though allegation "highly improbable"). 
3032. Compare Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985) (prisoner lacked standing 
to bring claims alleging mistreatment of fellow prisoners when no personal injury alleged); Darring 
v. Kincheloe, 783 F.2d 874, 877-78 (9th Cir. 1986) (prisoner lacked standing to challenge institu-
tional order on ground that it violated other inmate's rights when no legally cognizable injury 
alleged by plaintift) and Wahl v. Mciver, 773 F.2d 1169, 1173 (lith Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (pris-
oner lacked standing to bring claims alleging improper jail conditions after transfer because past 
exposure to illegal conduct does not provide standing in suit seeking injunctive relief if no present 
harm to plaintiff exists) with Gometz v. Henman, 807 F.2d 113, 115 (7th Cir. 1986) ("jailhouse 
lawyer" had standing to assert rights of another prisoner with whom he wished to communicate 
concerning legal matters). 
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Indigent prisoners seeking relief under section 1983 may petition a federal 
court to appoint counsel to represent them. 3033 Before a court may exercise 
its discretion to appoint counsel, it must be satisfied that the petitioner's 
claim is colorable. 3034 
Affirmative Defenses. Various affirmative defenses may prevent a prisoner 
from obtaining relief in a section 1983 action. A claim is normally barred, by 
the running of the statute of limitations. 3035 Furthermore, a prisoner may 
3033. 28 u.s.c. § 1915(d) (1988). 
3034. /d.; compare Sours v. Norris, 782 F.2d 106, 107 (8th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (appointment 
of counsel appropriate when § 1983 claim that prisoner transferred in violation of Interstate Correc-
tions Compact not malicious or frivolous, as evidenced by claim's survival of motion to dismiss) and 
McCarthy v. Weinberg, 753 F.2d 836, 838-39 (lOth Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (appointment of counsel 
appropriate when pro se prisoner suffering from severe physical handicaps presented colorable 
claim that doctor failed to provide physical therapy and medication to treat prisoner's multiple 
sclerosis) with Childs v. Pellegrin, 822 F.2d 1382, 1384-85 (6th Cir. 1987) (appointment of counsel 
inappropriate for claim asserting denial of access to courts when prisoner given opportunity to go 
before trial judge and review facts of case and when court determined claim lacked merit). 
In determining the appropriateness of appointing counsel, the circuit courts also consider the 
complexity of the legal issues involved. Compare Cookish v. Cunningham, 787 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 
1986) (per curiam) (court properly denied appointment of counsel for indigent civil litigant when 
claims did not involve difficult or complex issues); Jackson v. Cain, 864 F.2d 1235, 1242 (5th Cir. 
1989) (court did not abuse discretion in refusing to appoint counsel in prisoner's § 1983 case when 
case not particularly complex and prisoner proved capable of self-representation) and Wahl v. Mc-
Iver, 773 F.2d 1169, 1172-74 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (appointment of counsel inappropriate 
when essential facts of case and legal doctrines of immunity, mootness, and acting under color of • 
state law ascertainable to inmate without assistance of counsel) with Hodge v. Police Officers, 802 
F.2d 58, 59-61 (2d Cir. 1986) (court improperly denied appointment of counsel in civil rights case 
claiming police brutality when court failed to consider plaintiff's chance of success, complexity of 
factual issues, and plaintiff's ability to present case); cf Hahn v. McLey, 737 F.2d 771, 774 (8th Cir. 
1984) (per curiam) (although appointment of fellow inmate to assist with preparation of lawsuit 
permissible, court generally will not allow same inmate to serve as trial counsel when that appoint-
ment would allow him to leave prison to participate in trial). The Ninth Circuit requires a demon-
stration of both the "likelihood of success and the complexity of legal issues involved." Burns v. 
County of King, 883 F.2d 819, 824 (9th Cir. 1989). 
The Supreme Court has held that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) does not authorize a federal court to 
compel an attorney to represent an indigent litigant in a civil proceeding. Mallard v. U.S. Dist. 
Court, 490 U.S. 296, 300-02 (1989). I 
3035. In Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985), the Supreme Court held that because section 
1983 has no statute of limitations of its own, courts should apply the statute of limitations pertain-
ing to personal injury actions in the jurisdiction in which the claim arose. /d. at 275-80. In Owens 
v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235 ( 1989), the Court held that if the state in which the cause of action arose has 
more than one statute of limitations, the federal court should apply the residual or general personal 
injury statute oflimitations rather than the statute of limitations for specific intentional torts. /d. at 
236; see Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1522-23 (lOth Cir. 1988) (all § 1983 claims in Tenth 
Circuit will be uniformly held to two-year state statute of limitations for injury to personal rights of 
another and not to one-year statute of limitations for assault and battery). Moreover, in Board of 
Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 (1980), the Court held that in addition to applying the state 
statute of limitations, federal courts are obligated to apply the state's tolling rules unless doing so 
would produce results that are inconsistent with the policies underlying§ 1983. /d. at 483-86; see 
Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 543 (1989) (plaintiff entitled to benefit of Michigan provision sus-
pending limitations period for those under legal disability because statute consistent with § 1983); 
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release the defendants from liability by knowingly, willingly, and voluntarily 
agreeing not to pursue her section 1983 claim.3036 The doctrines of res judi-
cata and collateral estoppel may also bar a section 1983 action. 3037 
Under section 1983, liability is imposed only on persons responsible for the 
deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution and federal laws. 3038 In 
Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 3039 the Supreme Court held that 
a state is not a person within the meaning of section 1983.3040 The Court 
Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 348 (3d Cir. 1989) (plaintiff entitled to tolling provision because 
favorable termination of underlying proceeding necessary element in § 1983 claim); Hughes v. Sher-
iff of Fall River County Jail, 814 F.2d 532, 533 (8th Cir. 1987) (plaintiff entitled to benefit of South 
Dakota tolling provision despite express exclusion of federal civil rights suits in state statute); 
Marks v. Parra, 785 F.2d 1419, 1420 (9th Cir. 1986) (plaintiff entitled to benefit of Arizona tolling 
provision that excludes time when plaintiff in prison); Turner v. Evans, 721 F.2d 341, 341-42 (lith 
Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (plaintiff entitled to benefit of Georgia tolling provision suspending statute 
of limitations). 
3036. In Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386 (1987), the Supreme Court held that a per-
son arrested for witness tampering who agrees to release any section 1983 claims against the city in 
exchange for the city's dismissal of charges would be barred by the release from filing a subsequent 
section 1983 claim. Id. at 397-98. At a minimum, the release must be voluntary. /d. at 398; com-
pare Sexton v. Ryan, 804 F.2d 26, 27 (2d Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (release inherently suspect and 
unenforceable against suspect who claimed he was coerced into signing in exchange for police dis-
missing charges) with Hammond v. Bales, 843 F.2d 1320, 1322-23 (lOth Cir. 1988) (release-dismis-
sal agreement valid when not coerced and executed under judicial supervision); cf Lynch v. City of 
Alhambra, 880 F.2d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 1989) (remanding for determination of whether release-
'dismissal agreement served public interest even though agreement voluntary). 
3037. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 98-99 (1980); compare Pasterczyk v. Fair, 819 F.2d 12, 13-
14 (lst Cir. 1987) (prisoner's § 1983 suit for damages barred by res judicata when prisoner, who was 
returned to Massachusetts after escaping and serving sentence for subsequent crime in Arizona, 
prevailed in state suit claiming credit for original time served but failed to seek monetary remedy at 
time of first suit); Cameron v. Fogarty, 806 F.2d 380, 388-89 (2d Cir. 1986) (prisoner's false arrest 
conviction had preclusive effect on later § 1983 suit claiming police had no probable cause for 
arrest), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1016 (1987); Walker v. Schaeffer, 854 F.2d 138, 142-43 (6th Cir. 1988) 
(prisoners in § 1983 suit for false arrest and imprisonment collaterally estopped from relitigating 
issue of probable cause when prisoners had been convicted in state court and were given "reasonable 
and fair opportunity" to litigate claims); Ayers v. City of Richmond, 895 F.2d 1267, 1272 (9th Cir. 
1990) (prisoner's § 1983 action estopped by denial of motion to suppress) and Newcomb v. Ingle, 
827 F.2d 675, 677 (lOth Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (plaintiff may not bring § 1983 claims for unconsti-
tutional search and seizure when plaintiff had full and fair opportunity to litigate claims in suppres-
sion stage of state criminal action) with Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 316 (1983) (prisoner's 
guilty plea in criminal trial did not collaterally estop subsequent § 1983 claim of unlawful search); 
Brown v. Edwards, 721 F.2d 1441, 1448 (5th Cir. 1984) (prisoner's guilty plea no bar to litigation of 
probable cause issue in subsequent§ 1983 action when issue not actually litigated in prior proceed-
ing) and Heath v. Cast, 813 F.2d 254, 258-59 (9th Cir.) (order suppressing evidence not final judg-
ment for purposes of res judicata or collateral estoppel), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 849 (1987). 
3038. 42 u.s.c. § 1983 (1988). 
3039. 109 S.Ct. 2304 (1989). 
3040. This holding has its roots in the eleventh amendment, which prohibits a suit in federal 
court against a nonconsenting state or a state official when relief is in fact against the state. See 
Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). Because of the amend-
ment's prohibition and the congressional purpose of providing a federal forum for civil rights claims 
in enacting section 1983, the Will Cou~ found that Congress could not have intended to include an 
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also concluded that a suit against a state official in her official capacity is "no 
different from a suit against the state," and thus exempted such individuals 
from the definition of "person" unless the action involved a prayer for in-
junctive relief. 3041 Despite these limitations, the Court has included a mu-
nicipality within the definition of "person" under section 1983.3042 
If an alleged violator enjoys official immunity, the prisoner may be barred 
entity with eleventh amendment immunity within the definition of "person" under section 1983, 
which would have created a cause of action against a state only in state court. 109 S. Ct. at 2309. 
The scope of immunity to section 1983 actions is a question of federal law that cannot be overrid-
den by the states. Howlett v. Rose, 110 S. Ct. 2430, 2442 (1990); see Martinez v. California, 444 
U.S. 277, 284 & n.8 (1980) (California statute immunizing public entities and employees from liabil-
ity for parole release decisions preempted by § 1983). 
3041. /d. at 2311 & n.10. The critical issue in a suit against a state official in her official capacity, 
then, is whether prospective or retroactive relief is sought, because only the former can be obtained 
under§ 1983. This distinction arises because an entity with eleventh amendment protection is not a 
"person" within the meaning of§ 1983, but the entity's eleventh amendment immunity varies de-
pending upon the nature of the relief sought: while relief that serves to compensate a party injured 
in the past is barred, relief that serves "to bring an end to a violation of federal law is not barred 
even though accompanied by a substantial ancillary effect" on a state's treasury. Papasan v. Allain, 
478 U.S. 265, 278 (1986). The conclusion that suits seeking prospective relief are not against the 
state permits the use of§ 1983 when such relief is sought. Will, 109 S. Ct. at 2311 n.10; cf Hutto v. 
Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 695-95 (1978) (eleventh amendment no bar to claim for attorney's fees under 
42 U.S.C. § 1988 to prevailing party when governmental entity liable on the merits; Missouri v. 
Jenkins, 109 S. Ct. 2463, 2469 (1989) (eleventh amendment no bar to enhancement of fee award 
against state to compensate plaintiffs for delay in payment). 
3042. Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). In Monell, the Supreme Court 
held that a municipality or local government entity is not immune from section 1983 suits claiming 
monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief when the policy or custom, which is the subject of the 
suit, was adopted or implemented by the governing body's officials. /d. at 690-91. A local govern-
ment may not be held liable, however, merely because it employed the tortfeasor. /d. at 691-92. 
The employee must be acting under color of official policy before the municipality may be found 
liable. /d. at 694; compare Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 485 (1986) (county held 
liable for prosecutor's actions when prosecutor acting as final decisionmaker for county); City of 
Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-89 (1989) (municipality may be held liable under§ 1983 for 
failure to train police officers only when failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to rights 
of persons with whom police interact); Krulik v. Bd. of Educ., 781 F.2d 15, 23 (2d Cir. 1986) 
(dictum) (municipality may be held liable when municipal supervisors knowingly acquiesced to 
official's behavior because individual official's act rises to level of "policy" for purposes of§ 1983); 
Fundiller v. City of Cooper City, 777 F.2d 1436, 1442-43 (11th Cir. 1985) (city may be held liable 
because allegation that city adopted custom of allowing use of excessive force fulfilled requirement 
that custom be "moving force behind the constitutional deprivation" before § 1983 liability at-
taches) and Parker v. District of Columbia, 850 F.2d 708, 712-13 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (municipality 
liable under § 1983 when evidence of deliberate indifference to constitutional rights manifested by 
systematic and grossly inadequate training, discipline, and supervision of its police officers resulting 
in shooting of plaintiff by police officer during extra-jurisdictional arrest and disarmament), cert. 
denied, 109 S. Ct. 1339 (1989) with City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 128 (1988) (plural-
ity opinion) (municipality may not be held liable under § 1983 unless plaintiff proves the existence 
of an unconstitutional policy promulgated by officials having final policymaking ~uthority) and 
Palmer v. City of San Antonio, 810 F.2d 514, 516-17 (5th Cir. 1987) (city may not be held liable 
under § 1983 because plaintiff's showing of single incident not sufficient evidence of policy or cus-
tom of unnecessary force or wrongfully discharging weapon). 
In Howlett v. Rose, 110 S. Ct. 2430 (1990), the Supreme Court held that a state court may not 
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from obtaining relief under section 1983. Judges,3043 prosecutors,3044 and 
grant immunity to a municipality in state court because this entity, under federal law, does not have 
immunity in federal court. /d. at 2443. 
3043. In Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988), the Supreme Court stated that although judges 
enjoy absolute immunity from liability and damages for their judicial or adjudicatory acts, they are 
not absolutely immune for their administrative and executive functions. /d. at 227. The Forrester 
Court held that when a judge demoted and dismissed a probation officer, he was acting in an admin-
istrative capacity and was therefore not absolutely immune from liability and damages. /d. at 229; 
compare Malachowski v. City of Keene, 787 F.2d 704, 710 (1st Cir.) (per curiam) Gudge absolutely 
immune from damages when acting with jurisdiction over parental custody case), cert. denied, 479 
U.S. 828 (1986); Johnson v. Kegans, 870 F.2d 992, 995 (5th Cir.) Gudge absolutely immune in suit 
alleging that he filed letter with board of parole recommending denial of prisoner's parole in retalia-
tion for prisoner bringing civil rights suits), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3250 (1989); John v. Barron, 897 
F.2d 1387, 1392 (7th Cir.) Gudge absolutely immune from suit based on handling of trial), cert. 
denied, 111 S. Ct. 69 (1990) and New Alaska Dev. Corp. v. Guetschow, 869 F.2d 1298, 1302 (9th 
Cir. 1989) (judge absolutely immune from liability when he had subject matter jurisdiction and 
acted in judicial capacity when appointing receiver for corporation) with Morrison v. Lipscomb, 877 
F.2d 463, 466 (6th Cir. 1989) (state court judge not entitled to absolute immunity for executive 
action as Chief Judge of judicial district declaring moratorium on issuance of writs of restitution) 
and Kurowski v. Krajewski, 848 F.2d 767, 775 (7th Cir.) Gudge not absolutely immune when he 
terminated employment of former public defenders who did not share judge's political beliefs), cert. 
denied, 488 U.S. 926 (1988). 
Absolute judicial immunity extends only to suits for damages. It does not prevent a prisoner 
from seeking injunctive relief or attorneys fees in section 1983 actions. See Pulliam v. Allen, 466 
U.S. 522, 541-44 (1984) Gudicial immunity no bar to prospective injunction against judge who 
imposed bail on individuals charged with nonjailable offenses); Hollins v. Wessel, 819 F.2d 1073, 
1074 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) Gudicial immunity no bar to petition for injunction against 
mortgage foreclosure action on prisoner's property when prisoner not notified of proceedings or 
appointment of guardian ad litem). 
3044. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976); compare Barr v. Abrams, 810 F.2d 358, 
360-61 (2d Cir. 1987) (prosecutor acting within jurisdiction absolutely immune from damage action 
alleging violation of fifth amendment right to silence, although without jurisdiction, prosecutor 
would have been accorded only qualified immunity); Grant v. Hollenbach, 870 F.2d 1135, 1138-39 
(6th Cir. 1989) (prosecutors absolutely immune from suit alleging failure to investigate facts before 
and after indictment for child abuse and for knowingly bringing false charges); Myers v. Morris, 
810 F.2d 1437, 1445-47 (8th Cir.) (prosecutor absolutely immune even when plaintiff claimed that 
prosecutor acted recklessly, maliciously, fraudulently, and without proper investigation when multi-
ple suits filed against plaintiff for sexual activities with minors), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828 (1987); 
Lerwill v. Joslin, 712 F.2d 435, 439-40 (lOth Cir. 1983) (prosecutor absolutely immune even when 
acting beyond the scope of authority by invoking local statute under which not empowered to 
prosecute; prosecutor may lose absolute immunity, however, if actions are "so clearly beyond the 
bounds of a prosecutor's authority" that liability would not deter prosecutor from performing job) 
and Marx v. Gumbinner, 855 F.2d 783, 790 (11th Cir. 1988) (prosecutor absolutely immune when 
rendering legal advice regarding existence of probable cause) with Allen v. Lowder, 875 F.2d 82, 86 
(4th Cir. 1989) (prosecutor not absolutely immune in suit alleging prosecutor attempted to secure 
continued incarceration of defendant after reversal of conviction because acting in administrative 
capacity); Wolfenbarger v. Williams, 826 F.2d 930, 937 (lOth Cir. 1987) (district attorney not enti-
tled to absolut~ immunity for advice regarding existence of probable cause). 
Like judges, prosecutors are not immune from section 1983 cases seeking injunctive relief or 
attorney's fees. See Wilson v. Stocker, 819 F.2d 943, 950 (lOth Cir. 1987) (prosecutor absolutely 
immune from damage suits but not from claims for injunctive relief or attorney's fees in suit charg-
ing constitutional violation of arrestee's right to distribute campaign literature). 
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other judicial officials3045 acting in their official capacities enjoy absolute im-
munity from monetary damages. "Even if absolute immunity is unavailable, 
government officials performing discretionary functions generally are 
shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not 
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a rea-
3045. Parole board members and grand jurors have also been accorded absolute immunity. See 
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423 & n.20 (1976) (grand jurors immune when acting within 
scope of their duties); Harper v. Jeffries, 808 F.2d 281, 284 (3d Cir. 1986) (state parole board 
examiner absolutely immune in § 1983 damage action alleging parole revocation based on false 
information); Johnson v. Kegans, 870 F.2d 992, 995 & n.2 (5th Cir.) (parole board members abso-
lutely immune for actions taken in performance of official duties), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3250 
(1989); Farrish v. Mississippi State Parole Bd., 836 F.2d 969, 975 (5th Cir. 1988) (parole revocation 
hearing officer absolutely immune in § 1983 damage suit by parolee alleging revocation procedure 
violated right to due process because it did not afford opportunity to confront adverse witnesses); cf 
Fendler v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 774 F.2d 975, 979-80 (9th Cir. 1985) (parole board members ac-
corded absolute quasi-judicial immunity from Bivens claim for allegedly withholding documents 
during parole hearing). But see Lanier v. Fair, 876 F.2d 243, 253 (lst Cir. 1989) (parole board 
members entitled to qualified immunity with respect to rescission of reserve parole date). 
Like judges and prosecutors, parole board members and grand jurors are not immune from sec-
tion 1983 cases seeking injunctive relief or attorney's fees. See Dorman v. Higgins, 821 F.2d 133, 
139 (2d Cir. 1987) (although absolute immunity of parole officer no bar to plaintiff's petition for 
injunction against use of false information in presentencing report, complaint properly dismissed 
when no imminent danger of harm indicated). 
Other individuals accorded absolute immunity because oftheir judicially related activities include 
court-appointed psychiatrists, social workers, hearing examiners, federal and state probation of-
ficers, and court clerks and reporters. See Dorman v. Higgins, 821 F.2d 133, 137 (2d Cir. 1987) 
(federal probation officers absolutely immune from claims of including false information in presen-
tencing reports); Scruggs v. Moellering, 870 F.2d 376, 377 (7th Cir.) (court reporter absolutely 
immune from suit alleging falsification of transcript), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 371 (1989); Eades v. 
Sterlinske, 810 F.2d 723, 726 (7th Cir.) (court clerk absolutely immune from claim of falsification of 
docket records when judge ordered alterations), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 847 (1987); Moses v. Parwa-
tikar, 813 F.2d 891, 892 (8th Cir.) (court-appointed psychiatrist absolutely immune when she testi-
fied to plaintiff's competency to stand trial for burglary and murder), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 832 
(1987); Coverdell v. Dept. of Social and Health Servs., 834 F.2d 758,764-65 (9th Cir. 1987) (court 
appointed child protective services worker entitled to judicial immunity when acting pursuant to 
court order); Demoran v. Witt, 781 F.2d 155, 158 (9th Cir. 1986) (state probation officer absolutely 
immune from suit alleging probation officer filed false presentence report); Turner v. Barry, 856 
F.2d 1539, 1540 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (District of Columbia probation officer absolutely 
immune from suit alleging probation officer filed false presentence report). Court appointed receiv-
ers and trustees in bankruptcy also enjoy absolute immunity. See New Alaska Dev. Corp. v. Guet-
schow, 869 F.2d 1298, 1302-05 (9th Cir. 1989) (receiver appointed by state court to manage 
business assets of estate during marital dissolution normally enjoys absolute immunity; receiver not 
immune when actions involve theft and slander because not part of receiver function); Mullis v. 
U.S. Bankruptcy Court, 828 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987) (court appointed trustee in bankruptcy 
enjoys absolute immunity from liability when acting within "ambit" of official duties). 
Witnesses, including police officers, are also granted absolute immunity. See Briscoe v. LaHue, 
460 U.S. 325, 345-46 (1983) (police officer absolutely immune from liability for peljured testimony); 
Malachowski v. City of Keene, 787 F.2d 704, 712 (lst Cir.) (per curiam) (police officer absolutely 
immune in role as witness), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 828 (1986); Daloia v. Rose, 849 F.2d 74, 75-76 
(2d Cir. 1988) (police officers absolutely immune from liability for testimony at pretrial suppression 
hearing); Holt v. Castaneda, 832 F.2d 123, 125 (9th Cir. 1987) (same). 
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sonable person would have known."3046 This qualified immunity applies to 
prison personneP047 and police officers. 3048 
3046. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 197 
(1984) (plaintiff can only overcome qualified immunity by showing that rights clearly established at 
time of violation; no showing made when right to pretermination hearing or prompt post-termina-
tion hearing not clear from precedent). 
3047. Compare Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 206-07 (1985) (federal prison disciplinary 
committee members and warden granted qualified immunity in suit claiming administrative deten-
tion for inciting work stoppage violated prisoner's constitutional rights); Procunier v. Navarette, 
434 U.S. 555, 561 (1978) (state prison officials accorded qualified immunity); Maldonado Santiago 
v. Velazquez Garcia, 821 F.2d 822, 829-30 (1st Cir. 1987) (prison officials and guards entitled to 
qualified immunity from damages in case alleging emotional and psychological damages due to 
transfer to different prison without timely hearing); Henry v. Perry, 866 F.2d 657, 659 (3d Cir. 
1989) (prison guard entitled to qualified immunity in case claiming guard used deadly force to 
prevent escape of prisoner who had committed murder) and Hudson v. Edmonson, 848 F.2d 682, 
686-87 (6th Cir. 1988) (prison official entitled to qualified immunity for failure to state criteria used 
in enforcing particular sentence when he would not have known that disciplinary report and hear-
ing would violate plaintiff's due process rights) with Walsh v. Mellas, 837 F.2d 789, 800-01 (7th 
Cir.) (prison official not entitled to qualified immunity because constitutional duty to prevent in-
mate attacks violated by placing him in cell with known gang member), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1061 
(1988) and Greason v. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829, 836 (11th Cir. 1990) (prison officials denied summary 
judgment on issue of qualified immunity when jury question existed as to whether conduct 
amounted to deliberate indifference to prisoner's medical needs). 
3048. Compare Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639-40 (1987) (police officer entitled to 
qualified immunity if acts reasonable in eyes of reasonable officer in case charging that law enforce-
ment official made warrantless search of respondent's home on belief that bank robbery suspect 
hiding therein); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 339-40 (1986) (police entitled to qualified immunity 
in case claiming that arrest warrant, charging illegal drug possession, violated fourth and fourteenth 
amendments for failure to establish probable cause, unless warrant so lacking in indicia of probable 
cause that reasonable officer would not believe probable cause present); Bums v. Loranger, 907 F.2d 
233, 236 (1st Cir. 1990) (police entitled to qualified immunity when strip search of plaintiff objec-
tively reasonable because reasonable officer would not believe search violated clearly established 
right); Turner v. Dammon, 848 F.2d 440, 447 (4th Cir. 1988) (police officer entitled to qualified 
immunity from any claim arising out of search of premises conducted pursuant to valid search 
warrant because conduct objectively reasonable); Coon v. Ledbetter, 780 F.2d 1158, 1164 (5th Cir. 
1986) (police officer entitled to qualified immunity when conduct, although perhaps technically 
illegal, did not violate clearly established federal rights of which reasonable person would have 
known); Danese v. Asman, 875 F.2d 1239, 1245 (6th Cir. 1989) (police supervisors entitled to 
qualified immunity when prisoner hung himself in jail cell because not subject to clearly established 
constitutional duty to diagnose pretrial detainee's condition as prone to suicide), cert. denied, 110 S. 
Ct. 1473 (1990); Lowrance v. Pflueger, 878 F.2d 1014, 1019-20 (7th Cir. 1989) (sheriff accorded 
qualified immunity in case where application for arrest warrant had objectively reasonable basis 
that probable cause existed) and Los Angeles Protective League v. Gates, 907 F.2d 879, 888 (9th 
Cir. 1990) (police department employees entitled to qualified immunity with respect to issuance of 
administrative search warrant for officer's garage because they sought legal advice before obtaining 
warrant and legal issue "complex and unclear") with Fields v. City of Omaha, 810 F.2d 830, 835-36 
(8th Cir. 1987) (police officer not entitled to qualified immunity for violating investigatory stop 
requirements clearly established in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968), because officer unconsti-
tutionally applied city's loitering and prowling ordinance when he stopped and detained plaintiff 
without reasonable suspicion); O'Rourke v. City of Norman, 875 F.2d 1465, 1475-76 (lOth Cir.) 
(police officer not accorded qualified immunity arising from nighttime search pursuant to daytime 
bench warrant because officers should have known nighttime execution of warrant unreasonable 
under fourth amendment), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 280 (1989). 
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Available Remedies. Federal courts may award section 1983 claimants the 
full range of remedies available to civil litigants. Monetary relief may in-
clude nominal, 3049 compensatory, 30so and punitive damages. 3051 If an inmate 
continues to be deprived of her rights, federal courts may also grant injunc-
tive relief if there is a real and immediate threat that the prisoner will be the 
victim of an unconstitutional action. 3052 In addition, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 ex-
3049. See Maldonado Santiago v. Velazquez Garcia, 821 F.2d 822, 829 (1st Cir. 1987) (inmate 
entitled to nominal damages as compensation for constitutional injury even if unable to prove actual 
damages for emotional distress); Patterson v. Coughlin, 905 F.2d 564, 568 (2d Cir. 1990) (victim 
entitled to nominal damages for any violation of due process rights); Sahagian v. Dickey, 827 F.2d 
90, 100 (7th Cir. 1987) (prisoner entitled to nominal damages for violation of prisoner's right to 
legal materials despite absence of actual harm); Wiggins v. Rushen, 700 F.2d 1009, 1011-12 (9th 
Cir. 1985) (same). 
3050. Compare Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 (1986) (com-
pensatory damages awarded only for actual injuries; abstract value of violated constitutional rights 
cannot form basis for § 1983 damages); Ismail v. Cohen, 899 F.2d 183, 184 (2d Cir. 1990) Gury 
award of $650,00 as compensation for physical injuries caused by police officer upheld); Spell v. 
McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1400 (4th Cir. 1987) Gury award of$900,000 as compensation for police 
brutality upheld), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1027 (1988); Hale v. Fish, 899 F.2d 390,403 (5th Cir. 1990) 
(court's award of compensatory damages to arrestees upheld); Mairena v. Foti, 816 F.2d 1061, 
1065-66 (5th Cir. 1987) Gury award of $30,000 against district attorney as compensation for errone-
ously incarcerating plaintiff for 23 days based on material witness warrant upheld), cert. denied, 484 
U.S. 1005 (1988) and Jackson v. Crews, 873 F.2d 1105, 1109 (8th Cir. 1989) Gury award of $5,000 
as compensation for physical pain and suffering caused by police officer allegedly slamming plain-
tiff's face into pavement following arrest upheld) with Bailey v. Andrews, 811 F.2d 366, 375-76 (7th 
Cir. 1987) Gury award of $80,000 excessive when plaintiff suffered only scratched boots, tom pants, 
and bent glasses and submitted no bills for medical or psychological treatment). 
A prisoner's section 1983 claim for damages against a correctional facility does not become moot 
because he is later transferred to another facility. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 364-65 (1982) 
(per curiam). 
3051. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 51 (1983) (punitive damages proper in§ 1983 case when 
there is "reckless or callous disregard for the plaintiff's rights, as well as intentional violations of 
federal law"); Acosta-Sepulveda v. Hernandez-Purcell, 889 F.2d 9, 13 (lst Cir. 1989) (punitive 
damage award to wrongfully terminated public employee proper when employer had blatant disre-
gard for plaintiff's rights); O'Neill v. Krzeminski, 839 F.2d 9, 13-14 (2d Cir. 1988) (punitive dam-
age award of $185,000 upheld in § 1983 action against police officers who denied plaintiff medical 
attention after breaking his nose while using excessive force); Cooper v. Dyke, 814 F.2d 941, 943-48 
(4th Cir. 1987) (punitive damage award proper when police ignored boy's pleas for assistance for 
nearly two hours before obtaining medical assistance for gunshot wounds); Melear v. Spears, 862 
F.2d 1177, 1187 (5th Cir. 1989) (punitive damage award proper against deputy sheriff when kicked 
in apartment doors during search for suspect who was seen running toward apartment building); 
Wright v. Jones, 907 F.2d 848, 852 (8th Cir. 1990) (punitive damage award proper if inmates can 
show that guards acted in reckless disregard of prisoner's rights; no showing of malice needed to 
obtain punitive damages); cf Hale v. Fish, 899 F.2d 390, 404 (5th Cir. 1990) (court has discretion 
not to award punitive damages when performing role of factfinder). But see City of Newport v. 
Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. 247, 259-66 (1981) (punitive damages cannot be awarded in § 1983 suit 
against municipality). 
3052. Compare Estrada-Izquierdo v. Aponte-Roque, 850 F.2d 10, 18-19 (lst Cir. 1988) (injunc-
tive order to reinstate plaintiff proper when plaintiff unconstitutionally dismissed because of her 
political affiliation); Green v. McCall, 822 F.2d 284, 293 (2d Cir. 1987) (injunctive relief requiring 
compliance with regulations proper when history of noncompliance exists, even though parole com-
mission had regulations in place for parole rescission hearing) and Williams v. Lane, 851 F.2d 867, 
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pressly provides that courts may award attorney's fees to the prevailing 
party.JOSJ 
883-84 (7th Cir. 1988) (injunction and appointment of special master to implement just remedy 
upheld when inmates successfully claimed denial of free exercise of religion, meaningful access to 
the courts, and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1047 (1989) 
with Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401-03 (1975) (injunctive relief dismissed as moot when 
potential for recurrence of allegedly unconstitutional transfers between prisons slight); cf Toussaint 
v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1086-87 (9th Cir. 1986) (injunctive relief governing conditions of 
confinement and segregation procedures at state prison modified when determined to be broader 
than necessary to remedy constitutional violation), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1069 (1987). 
3053. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988) provides that "[i]n any action or proceeding to enforce a provision 
[of certain statutes, including section 1983,] the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing 
party ... a reasonable attorney's fee as part of costs." /d.; see Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 
1006 (1984) (section 1988 gives courts broad authority to make§ 1988 awards of attorney's fees); cf 
North Carolina Dep't. of Transp. v. Crest St. Community Council, 479 U.S. 6, 12 (1986) (courts 
may grant attorney's fees under § 1988 only for action to enforce an enumerated civil rights stat-
ute). 
The party requesting attorney's fees must be the "prevailing party." 42 U.S.C. § 1988. In Texas 
State Teachers v. Garland Independent School District, 489 U.S. 782 (1989), the Supreme Court 
held that a plaintiff is a "prevailing party" if she "has succeeded on 'any significant issue in litiga-
tion which achieve[d] some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.'" /d. at 791-92 (quot-
ing Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (1st Cir. 1978)). The Court also indicated that the 
plaintiff must point "to a resolution of the dispute which changes the legal relationship between 
itself and the defendant," insuring that the judgment was not merely a "technical victory." /d. at 
792. Similarly, in Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1 (1988) (per curiam), the Supreme Court stated that 
a party meets the "prevailing party" requirement if, and only if, the judgment affects the behavior of 
the defendant towards the plaintiff. The Court held that plaintiffs who won a declaratory judgment 
against prison officials did not prevail for purposes of section 1988 because the judgment did not 
affect the behavior of the defendant towards the plaintiffs when one plaintiff had died and the other 
plaintiff had been released by the time the district court entered its order. /d. at 2; see Rogers v. 
Okin, 821 F.2d 22, 25-26 (1st Cir. 1987) (plaintiffs deemed "prevailing party" and awarded attor-
ney's fees even though only injunctive relief granted), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1010 (1988); Cobb v. 
Miller, 818 F.2d 1227, 1233-35 (5th Cir. 1987) (plaintiff deemed "prevailing party" even though 
only one of three defendants held liable and plaintiff only recovered nominal damages). 
In Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755 (1987), the Supreme Court also stated that in certain circum-
stances defendants may perform voluntary acts that afford the plaintiff all the relief sought without 
having a court enter a final judgment. /d. at 760-61. In such a case, the plaintiff should be deemed 
the "prevailing party." /d. (dictum); compare Heath v. Brown, 807 F.2d 1229, 1233 (5th Cir. 1987) 
(per curiam) (dictum) (court must find suit was "substantial factor or a significant catalyst in moti-
vating the defendants to end their unconstitutional behavior" in order for plaintiff to "prevail" 
without obtaining legal relief (quoting Hennigan v. Ouachita Parish School Bd., 749 F.2d 1148, 
1152 (5th Cir. 1985))); Loudermill v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 844 F.2d 304, 312-13 (6th Cir.) 
(plaintiff "prevailed" when lawsuit resulted in landmark Supreme Court case which served as cata-
lyst for change in board practices even though plaintiff did not win individual relief), cert. denied, 
488 U.S. 941 (1988) and Foremaster v. City of St. George, 882 F.2d 1485, 1488 (lOth Cir. 1989) 
(plaintiff entitled to attorney's fees absent judicial relief when lawsuit causally linked to relief ob-
tained and defendant's response to lawsuit required by Jaw), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1937 (1990) 
with Quinn v. Missouri, 891 F.2d 190, 194 (8th Cir. 1989) (plaintiffs not entitled to attorney's fees in 
suit challenging state statute later declared unconstitutional because plaintiffs gained nothing from 
suit). 
A prevailing defendant in a civil rights case may recover section 1988 attorney's fees when the 
suit is vexatious, frivolous, or brought to harass the defendant. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 
429 n.2 (1983); compare Glick v. Gutbrod, 782 F.2d 754, 757 (7th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (defend-
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ant awarded attorney's fees as sanction for plaintiff's "frivolous appeals to harass") and V -1 Oil Co. 
v. Wyoming Dep't. of Envtl. Quality, 902 F.2d 1482, 1490 (lOth Cir.) (prevailing defendant entitled 
to attorney's fees covering both trial work and work on appeal of fee award since appeal frivolous), 
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 295 (1990) with Coats v. Pierce, 890 F.2d 728, 733-34 (5th Cir. 1989) (de-
fendants entitled to attorney's fees only when plaintiff's action frivolous, unreasonable or without 
foundation), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 70 (1990) and Gilbert v. Ben-Asher, 900 F.2d 1407, 1411-12 
(9th Cir.) (defendant board of medical examiners not awarded attorney's fees even though plain-
tiff's claims barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 177 (1990); cf 
Smith v. DeBartoli, 769 F.2d 451, 453 (7th Cir. 1985) (plaintiff not awarded attorney's fees as 
sanction for vexatious suit), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1067 (1986). But see Popham v. City of Ken-
nesaw, 820 F.2d 1570, 1582-83 (11th Cir. 1987) (defendant not awarded attorney's fees even though 
possible that plaintiff brought suit to harass city because prevailed on claims against other defen-
dant). 
In Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983), the Supreme Court established guidelines for cal-
culating attorney's fees under section 1988. Courts should first multiply the number of hours rea-
sonably expended by an attorney on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate. /d. at 433; see Cobb 
v. Miller, 818 F.2d 1227, 1231 (5th Cir. 1987) (number of hours expended multiplied by hourly rate 
frequently referred to as "lodestar"). If the plaintiff did not prevail on a claim unrelated to the 
successful claims, the hours spent on the unsuccessful claim should be excluded when calculating 
the fee. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435; see Allen v. Higgins, 902 F.2d 682, 684 (8th Cir. 1990) (inmate 
awarded only 50% of requested attorney's fees when plaintiff prevailed on only one claim and 
received only nominal damages); Williams v. Mensey, 785 F.2d 631, 640 (8th Cir. 1986) (inmate 
awarded only 10% of requested attorney's fee when he prevailed on only one of seven claims); 
Kurowski v. Krajewski, 848 F.2d 767, 776-77 (7th Cir.) (inmate awarded 100% of requested attor-
ney's fees when suit completely successful, even though fees were 25% of total recovery), cert. 
denied, 488 U.S. 926 (1988); Iqbal v. Golf Course Superintendent's Ass'n. of America, 900 F.2d 
227, 228 (lOth Cir. 1990) (30% reduction of lodestar fee appropriate given limited success of 
plain tift). 
